Nomura and Aventus (TSXV: AVTS), an integrated insurance and alternative asset management company backed by CC Capital, have launched a joint venture designed to offer investors access to differentiated opportunities, primarily in securitized products and private credit.
Through Misura, clients gain access to end-to-end asset sourcing and origination, alongside specialized investment advisory and portfolio management. This collaboration uniquely leverages the capabilities of Nomura’s renowned securitized products and private credit franchise to create bespoke capital solutions, combining them with Aventus’s expertise in underwriting and managing credit investments, as well as the extensive track record of its sponsor, CC Capital.
“This partnership brings together the agility and capabilities of a specialized investment manager with the origination reach of a global investment bank to create a highly differentiated credit platform. In a market where origination, structuring expertise, and investment discipline are decisive, we believe our complementary strengths provide a solid foundation for an enduring business that builds upon the CC Capital and Aventus platform and positions it to capture attractive opportunities across both the full credit spectrum and special situations,” stated Chinh Chu, Founder and Senior Managing Director of CC Capital and Executive Chairman of Aventus.
For his part, Chris Willcox, Deputy President, Head of Wholesale, and Chair of the Investment Management Division at Nomura, noted: “Expanding our securitized products and private markets solutions business is a top strategic priority, and through this joint venture, we have succeeded in broadening our footprint by leveraging the scale of Nomura’s franchise alongside Aventus’s investment management capabilities. We are pleased to collaborate with the CC Capital and Aventus teams on the launch of Misura.”
Regarding the alliance, Gordon Sweely, Head of Securitized Products and Private Credit at Nomura, commented: “Misura brings together Nomura’s industry-leading expertise, global reach, and specialized focus to deliver tailored financing solutions to clients. This partnership expands our distribution capabilities across the entire capital structure, enabling us to bring Nomura’s premier platform to a broader client base.”
And Andrew Rabinowitz, Chief Executive Officer of Misura Asset Management, concluded: “We have built a platform that combines specialized investment talent, proven across multiple market cycles, with a large-scale origination engine, while preserving independence in underwriting and investment decision-making. I am excited about what Nomura and Aventus can create together, and I thank the entire Nomura team for their pivotal role in developing the platform.”
From Nvidia to McDonald’s, Intel, and Nestlé, romantic scandals, conflicts of interest, and the personal conduct of top executives have demonstrated that a company’s reputation can also rest in the hands of whoever occupies the corner office.
The fall of Jensen Huang not only represents an unexpected episode in Nvidia’s history, but also places back on the table one of the most delicate issues in corporate governance: how far does a CEO’s private life extend when personal decisions can compromise the interests of a company, its shareholders, and thousands of employees?
Private life, yet public
The answer is not simple, yet there is something that large corporations are increasingly clear about: the conduct of the person holding the top executive position is not an exclusively personal matter when it can generate conflicts of interest, call into question the enforcement of internal rules, or compromise the organization’s reputation.
The case of Huang, who stepped down this Thursday, November 12, from the presidency, chief executive role, and his seat on Nvidia’s board of directors after 33 years at the helm of the company, constitutes a particularly illustrative example.
The departure occurred after the businessman publicly acknowledged having been unfaithful to his wife and reports surfaced regarding romantic relationships allegedly involving a woman suspected of maintaining ties to Chinese intelligence services and a Nvidia executive who, according to media reports, reported directly to him. The company had previously opened an independent investigation and retained external legal counsel. Although the resignation statement did not expressly attribute the decision to a specific cause, the sequence of events turned the personal episode into a corporate governance and reputational crisis.
Investor reaction was immediate. Nvidia shares plunged around 14% during early trading on Thursday, November 12, touching an intraday low of $148.80 before ultimately closing at $166.19, down 4.34%.
The company, whose market capitalization hovers around $4.2T, had to announce that Colette Kress, until then Chief Financial Officer, would assume the interim chief executive role while the board searches for a permanent successor. The market reacted not only to the departure of one of the most influential figures of the artificial intelligence revolution, but also to the uncertainty entailed by losing the man who built much of the company’s technological and strategic identity.
Other corporate scandals
The case of Nvidia’s CEO is not inaugurating a new category of corporate scandal. In fact, one of the closest precedents occurred at Intel in 2018, when Brian Krzanich had to resign as CEO after an internal investigation confirmed he had engaged in a consensual relationship with an employee, in violation of the company’s non-fraternization policy applicable to all executives.
The board’s decision was decisive: if the rest of the workforce was obligated to respect internal rules, the company’s top executive could not place himself above them. The similarity to the Nvidia episode is evident: the corporate problem does not necessarily consist of passing judgment on a romantic relationship, but rather determining whether a reporting relationship, a conflict of interest, or a breach of the rules meant to guarantee impartiality in business decisions exists.
A year later, in 2019, McDonald’s faced a similar situation. Its then-CEO, Steve Easterbrook, was fired after the company discovered he was engaged in a consensual romantic relationship with an employee, something prohibited by its internal policies.
However, the matter did not end with his departure. A subsequent investigation revealed other undisclosed relationships with employees and raised questions regarding the information he had provided to the company. The case escalated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which in 2023 sanctioned the former executive for making false or misleading statements to investors regarding the circumstances of his termination.
It also scrutinized McDonald’s disclosure of his separation agreement, which had allowed him to retain compensation exceeding $40M. The company ultimately recovered approximately $105M in cash and stock. The lesson extended far beyond infidelity: concealing information, manipulating internal processes, or prioritizing personal interests can turn into an issue directly tied to shareholder protection.
More recently, in September 2025, Nestlé fired its CEO Laurent Freixe after confirming he was maintaining an undisclosed romantic relationship with a direct subordinate, in violation of its code of business conduct.
The investigation took place following internal complaints related to potential preferential treatment toward the employee. The episode underscored that integrity policies are not merely compliance mechanisms for operational tiers: they can also determine the tenure of a multinational’s top executive. And, above all, that the issue takes on another dimension when a personal relationship can influence promotions, compensation, evaluations, or decisions regarding company resources.
Loss of trust and other scandals, the blow to corporate culture
Nevertheless, romantic relationships represent only part of a much broader list of behaviors that have ended up shaking major corporations and eroding market confidence.
Volkswagen was at the center of one of the largest industrial scandals of recent decades with the so-called Dieselgate, uncovered in 2015, when it was revealed that the automaker had used software to manipulate emissions tests on its diesel vehicles. The crisis triggered the resignation of its then-CEO, Martin Winterkorn, in addition to fines, settlements, and a deterioration of its global reputation. In this instance it was not a matter of romantic conduct, but rather business decisions that compromised an organization’s ethics, transparency, and accountability toward its customers and regulators.
Enron represents another of the most forceful examples of how ambition and an absence of controls can destroy corporate trust. The U.S. energy giant collapsed in 2001 after complex accounting practices, debt concealment, and manipulation of its financial results came to light.
Its top executives, among them Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, became associated with one of the largest corporate frauds in U.S. history. The bankruptcy wiped out thousands of jobs and retirement savings belonging to workers and investors. The case made clear that a company can project an image of success, innovation, and growth for years while its top leaders erode from within the very principles meant to sustain it.
There is also the case of Wells Fargo, where the opening of millions of bank accounts without customer authorization, driven by aggressive sales targets and high-pressure practices placed on employees, led to a crisis of confidence that culminated in the departure of its CEO, John Stumpf, in 2016.
Uber, for its part, saw its corporate culture falter under the leadership of Travis Kalanick, amid allegations of harassment, management failures, and scrutiny over the workplace environment, until he stepped down as chief executive in 2017. These are distinct episodes, yet they share a common thread: when an organization’s culture ceases to align with the principles it proclaims, the cost ultimately transfers to its reputation, its ability to attract talent, and the confidence of its investors.
What unites these cases is not necessarily the nature of the infractions, but the position of those at the center of them. A CEO is not just another employee. A CEO manages other people’s capital, represents the organization before the markets, participates in strategic decisions, and bears a special responsibility in building a culture of integrity.
For that reason, romantic relationships with subordinates, undisclosed conflicts of interest, abuse of power, manipulation of information, accounting fraud, or the concealment of problems cannot be analyzed solely from a personal standpoint. At a publicly traded company, any of those behaviors can carry financial, legal, and reputational consequences.
The issue is also tied to a paradox of corporate leadership: companies routinely demand strict levels of compliance, transparency, and accountability from their employees, yet when irregularities involve their top executives, boards of directors face a far more complex test. They must decide whether to protect a figure who may be vital to the business or uphold the rules, even when doing so means losing a founder, a successful executive, or the person who publicly represents the company. Nvidia has just confronted that dilemma, and its decision will carry consequences reaching far beyond Huang’s succession.
Ultimately, Wall Street can forgive strategic missteps, quarterly earnings below expectations, or even misguided investment decisions if there is a reasonable explanation and a path to recovery. What proves far harder to restore is trust when investors begin questioning the integrity of those leading a company.
The private life of a CEO should be, in principle, precisely that: private. Yet when personal decisions compromise impartiality, safety, transparency, or compliance with corporate rules, it ceases to be so. Nvidia, Intel, McDonald’s, and Nestlé, to name a few cases, serve as reminders that at major corporations power also entails obligations. No CEO, however successful or indispensable they may appear, should stand above them. The market knows it, and the market remembers.
Photo courtesyStefan Kuhn, Head of ETF Distribution for EMEA at Fidelity International.
ETFs are experiencing strong growth, and the trend is set to continue. According to Fidelity International’s latest survey, European professional investors are preparing to increase their allocations to active exchange-traded funds. Specifically, average allocations to active ETFs are projected to rise from the current 10.2% of portfolios to 14.6% over the next 18 months. Against this backdrop, Stefan Kuhn, Head of ETF Distribution for EMEA at Fidelity International, breaks down the trends and challenges surrounding these vehicles, including a growing tilt toward more index-oriented solutions as well as longevity and retirement planning.
ETFs have experienced a genuine boom in Europe in recent years. What factors will help sustain this trend in the near future?
More and more savers are taking the step to become investors. Issues such as longevity and retirement planning occupy a central place in conversations with end clients today, and ETFs have established themselves as one of the preferred options for those starting to invest. At the same time, there is a growing tilt toward more index-oriented solutions for certain parts of portfolios. There remains ample room for actively managed funds, but combining high-conviction active strategies with more indexed solutions is gaining increasing prominence.
In general terms, what trends are you observing in the European ETF industry?
Without a doubt, we are seeing a clear trend toward active ETF solutions. It remains to be seen whether demand will concentrate primarily on strategies with a stronger index orientation or whether it will eventually shift toward genuinely active funds packaged in an ETF format. In my view, the former makes more sense, as an ETF is not just an investment vehicle or format, but almost a philosophy. Cost-efficient, index-oriented, and systematically managed solutions packaged inside an ETF appear to be precisely what the market demands.
Which European countries are recording the strongest ETF growth?
The main ETF markets in Europe are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, although France and the Nordic countries are also gaining ground rapidly. In Spain, the transfer regime poses a certain obstacle, as the tax treatment of traditional unlisted mutual funds, including index funds, is more favorable than that of ETFs. Were this situation to change, there is significant latent demand that could drive the growth of the Spanish market.
What lessons can Europe learn from the United States to continue driving ETF growth?
One of the main lessons is the naturalness with which the debate around retirement and the potential retirement savings gap is approached. In the United States, people talk much more openly about how they invest for retirement than in Europe. Although Europeans are aware that they will likely need to save more to supplement their retirement, these conversations are not as widespread as across the Atlantic. It is also worth noting that ETFs in the United States enjoy a significant tax advantage over traditional mutual funds, which is not the case in Europe. Even so, the appeal of more index-oriented solutions within the ETF format is a reality across the continent.
What would you advise an investor who does not yet hold ETFs in their portfolio, but is considering adding them over the short or medium term?
Over the short term, broad exposure to global equities is probably the most logical first step. That exposure can be obtained through either an active or a passive ETF. Maintaining an equity allocation remains, over the long term, one of the best ways to preserve purchasing power against inflation. Over a more medium-term horizon, active ETFs prove particularly attractive. It is not merely about replicating the market, but about benefiting from the contribution of an active manager seeking to generate additional value relative to the index.
Which ETF strategies currently offer the best opportunities?
For the retail investor, the greatest opportunities remain in U.S. and global equity exposures. For professional investors, opportunities tend to lie in more specialized or niche strategies. In my opinion, end investors should not overcomplicate their portfolio construction. If they manage their investments on their own, the most important thing is to be invested in the market. For those who have or are willing to seek financial advice, portfolio construction takes on even greater relevance, as professional investors have access to a much broader toolkit and set of strategies.
Also noteworthy is the growth of outcome-oriented ETFs, whether focused on income generation or strategies featuring partial downside protection mechanisms.
Does the rise of active ETFs make index funds less attractive?
In Spain, I fear the decisive factor remains taxation rather than performance itself. Beyond the tax disadvantage that ETFs currently face in the Spanish market, I consider active ETFs to be considerably more attractive than passive ones.
What are Fidelity International’s goals in the ETF business, for example in terms of inflows, assets under management, or entry into new markets?
As our Head of EMEA, Samantha Ricciardi, has noted, our objective is to more than triple current assets under management to reach €60B over the coming years. Furthermore, we aspire to remain among the 3 largest providers of active ETFs both in Europe and globally.
Jupiter Asset Management has announced the appointment of William Lopez and Selina Tyler as Co-Heads of its Client Group, effective January 1, 2027. According to the asset manager, Selina joined Jupiter in the spring of 2025 as Head of UK and has since restructured and revitalized the British team, while strengthening and developing key strategic client relationships. Selina will continue leading the UK market—Jupiter’s largest business—and will also assume leadership of the Client Experience and Market Intelligence teams.
Meanwhile, William joined Jupiter in 2018, initially assuming responsibility for the Latin America business and subsequently for Iberia, before also taking over oversight of broader European markets last year. Both have made a significant impact on Jupiter’s market presence and in driving the turnaround currently evident across the firm. Furthermore, William will focus on the higher-growth businesses outside the UK (Europe, Asia, and the Americas) and will also lead Jupiter’s Institutional and Client Solutions teams.
In addition to these 2 changes, Jupiter also announces that Maximilian Guenzl will transition into the newly created role of Chief Strategy Officer. Max has completed 3 successful years at the helm of the Client Group, transforming how Jupiter engages with its clients and fostering the positive momentum currently seen across the entire firm. According to the firm, in this new position, Guenzl will leverage his deep understanding of Jupiter’s clients and their evolving needs to ensure the Group is strategically positioned to deliver its active management expertise to a broader client base. Moreover, he will help define and drive the Group’s strategic agenda, identifying organic and inorganic growth opportunities in a rapidly transforming environment.
Regarding these changes, Matthew Beesley, CEO of Jupiter AM, commented: “I am delighted that Selina and William are becoming Co-Heads of Jupiter’s Client Group. Both have made a real difference to the firm since joining, and their complementary experience and expertise place them in an ideal position to continue building on our positive momentum. During his 3 years leading the Client Group, Max has been instrumental in generating this momentum. Under his leadership, a transformative shift has taken place in how we engage with our clients, deepening relationships and expanding the reach of our active investment expertise. In this new phase, his insight into the rapidly evolving needs of our clients will be decisive in ensuring we are best positioned to capture the opportunities ahead.”
Following the CCLA transaction
Furthermore, Jupiter communicates that, having led the CCLA transaction and played a pivotal role in driving its integration, Peter Hugh Smith, Chief Executive Officer of CCLA, and Elizabeth Sheldon, Chief Operating Officer of CCLA, will step down from their respective roles. Peter and Liz joined CCLA in 2019 and 2011, respectively, and have overseen a period of solid growth, reshaping the entity’s operating model during a time of profound industry change.
Consequently, Andrew Robinson MBE will be appointed Executive Chair of CCLA. Since joining in 2006, Andrew has been the driving force behind CCLA’s consolidation across the UK non-profit and local authority sectors. In his new role, he will play a key part as the public face of CCLA.
“Andrew has been the visionary and architect behind CCLA’s extraordinary growth since his arrival in 2006. Thanks to his work, CCLA is recognized today as one of the leading asset managers in the UK non-profit and local authority sectors. Both Peter and Liz have been central to CCLA’s success in recent years and have played an essential role in the acquisition and integration process. Personally, I owe them a debt of gratitude for their commitment and support over the past 18 months,” Beesley added.
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are on track to set record levels for both product launches and liquidations. Steady asset expansion and accelerating institutional adoption are prompting issuers to bring new strategies to market, but the proliferation of product lineups has intensified competition for assets under management, distribution shelf space, and internal capital. Consequently, ETF sponsors must determine not only which products to launch, but also which strategies warrant ongoing investment, according to “The Cerulli Report—U.S. Exchange-Traded Fund Markets 2026.”
During the first half of 2026, the industry rolled out 733 ETFs and liquidated 145, placing both metrics on pace to rival or surpass recent historical highs. Against this backdrop, product rationalization is becoming an essential operational discipline as sponsors evaluate which strategies demonstrate sufficient commercial viability to justify continued capital allocation.
According to Cerulli, 65% of ETF issuers identify balancing product development versus product rationalization as one of their primary operational concerns. Shifting investor demand and product differentiation follow at 61%, ranking ahead of market volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty at 35%.
When deciding which products to sunset, sponsors place the greatest weight on commercial viability. An overwhelming 88% of issuers cite insufficient asset growth as a key driver of liquidation decisions, while 69% point to inadequate demand from core distribution partners.
In contrast, 38% point to underperformance of the underlying investment strategy. These findings demonstrate that an ETF does not necessarily have to fail from an investment performance standpoint to face closure; it becomes equally vulnerable when it fails to build a credible asset gathering trajectory or secure distribution support.
“Early adoption, asset growth, and differentiated products can indicate an ETF with upside potential, but they do not guarantee sustained commercial viability,” states Kevin Lyons, Associate Director. “Both market conditions and allocator preferences can pivot rapidly, requiring ETF sponsors to continuously monitor their lineups across multiple operational fronts, including organic asset growth, absolute and relative performance, competitive fee positioning, distribution momentum, and client demand,” he notes.
Cerulli recommends that ETF lineup rationalization should not be viewed merely as the terminal phase of an unsuccessful strategy. “Product rationalization is a required discipline that enables sponsors to build more focused and commercially sustainable lineups,” notes Lyons, adding that the most successful asset managers “will not be defined by the gross quantity of ETFs on their platform, but by their capability to isolate strategies backed by authentic client demand and distribution access, act decisively when that viability erodes, and redeploy internal resources toward future growth drivers.”
Following the November 2026 U.S. midterm elections, the price of gold recorded a sharp bullish rebound, marking its best weekly performance in several months and reclaiming the psychological threshold of $4,000 per ounce. “Gold stabilized to some extent on Wednesday following Tuesday’s losses. The metal continues to find support in sustained demand from central banks. These collectively purchased 321 tons during Q3, extending an aggressive official-sector buying pattern. Robust demand could help contain any selling wave across the gold market,” notes Tim Furey, founder and CEO of Tradeview Markets & YimmiT, regarding its performance.
Taking the U.S. midterm elections as a benchmark, spot gold surged more than 3.4% in a single day during the post-election session, marking its largest daily advance since mid-August. “The metal moved from testing late-October lows near $3,870 to clearing $4,060 – $4,150 per ounce in the sessions following the vote, consolidating a weekly gain near 5%,” indicates Furey.
Catalysts behind the rally
Market experts identify the legislative gridlock produced by the election outcome as a primary catalyst for this rally. “This divided government backdrop typically narrows the runway for aggressive expansionary fiscal measures, unilateral tax cuts, or outsized debt ceiling increases, which curtailed expectations of expanding public debt,” notes Franklin Templeton.
A second driver was the pullback in Treasury yields. In this regard, expectations of reduced fiscal pressure and spending restraint exerted downward pressure on U.S. sovereign debt yields. This lowered the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets, directly benefiting bullion.
Lastly, analysts point toward an easing of geopolitical risk. Post-election signals indicated a lower probability of abrupt near-term trade or military escalations, mitigating pressure on energy commodities such as crude oil and dampening inflation concerns that might otherwise compel the Federal Reserve (Fed) to tighten monetary policy further.
Outlook for gold
When assessing the trajectory for gold, the $4,000 level has established itself as the critical support benchmark. “Our projections for gold indicate prices approaching $4,800 per ounce by Q3 2027. We expect this recovery to support silver given its precious metal characteristics and investment demand. However, industrial weakness will likely temper silver’s participation in this advance,” states Nitesh Shah, Head of Commodities and Investment Strategists at WisdomTree.
For Ned Naylor-Leyland, gold and silver fund manager at Jupiter AM, the structural case for gold—and silver—remains intact. He explains that “the secular trend toward fiat currency debasement relative to gold, expanding central bank balance sheets, and de-dollarization is deeply entrenched and persistent. Rather than viewing gold as a productive asset, I regard it as a risk-free monetary unit that preserves purchasing power as fiat currencies depreciate over time.”
FOMO, the acronym for fear of missing out, describes the anxiety an individual experiences when believing others are capturing profits in which they do not share. Originating within social media, the term is widely used today across finance to define a specific behavior: purchasing an asset following an aggressive rally, driven not by conviction regarding its intrinsic value, but by the fear of missing the train.
The underlying mechanics of this dynamic stem from behavioral finance, the discipline examining how emotional impulses and cognitive biases distort economic decision-making. FOMO combines several of these biases. Herd behavior prompts market participants to mirror the actions of the majority. Loss aversion, conceptualized by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (2 cognitive psychologists whose research reshaped psychology, economics, and our understanding of human cognition), establishes that the psychological pain of a financial loss is significantly greater than the satisfaction derived from an equivalent gain. Recency bias fosters the assumption that market trends observed over recent months will persist indefinitely. Compounding this is social comparison: observing a peer or an influencer display outsized returns amplifies the emotional pressure to deploy capital.
This dynamic is neither confined to a single geographic market nor limited to a specific asset class. It was visible during the technology bubble of the late 1990s, across the residential real estate market preceding the 2008 financial crisis, throughout the cryptocurrency run-up, and during the 2021 meme stock phenomenon. It also manifests in more understated environments, such as when capital flows concentrate into trending funds or themes after they have already recorded substantial advances. The sequence follows a familiar cycle: asset prices appreciate, media coverage expands, retail and institutional inflows accelerate, and that incremental demand fuels further gains until the cycle eventually reverses.
The costs of impulse execution
The primary risk centers on allocating near cyclical peaks, which compresses future return potential and exposes portfolios to severe drawdowns. Furthermore, market participants entering positions without a defined time horizon frequently capitulate during the initial market correction, converting unrealized paper drawdowns into permanent capital impairment. Additional consequences include extreme portfolio concentration in a single asset and the complete abandonment of the underlying investment mandate.
Mitigating the impulse begins with recognizing it. Several portfolio management practices help neutralize its impact:
Formulating a written investment policy statement detailing return objectives, time horizon, risk tolerance, and target asset allocation.
Diversifying across asset classes, sectors, and geographic jurisdictions to reduce portfolio dependency on a single speculative thesis.
Rebalancing portfolios systematically: this mechanism enforces trimming outperforming assets and reallocating toward lagging segments, operating as the mechanical antithesis of FOMO.
Dollar-cost averaging via recurring contributions, removing reliance on single-point market timing.
Introducing a deliberate cooling-off period prior to trade execution, asking: would this asset be attractive had it not just rallied?
FOMO is not an affliction exclusive to retail investors; it impacts seasoned market professionals and institutional allocators alike. The institutional edge lies in establishing an execution process that insulates decision-making from emotional volatility. In markets where an apparently unmissable trend is perpetually emerging, the disciplined investor is not the one attempting to catch every momentum wave, but the one who adheres strictly to their strategic plan and can rationally justify every capital allocation.
The U.S. currency faces gradual erosion as a reserve asset and an expanding search for alternatives in international trade. However, its dominance across foreign exchange markets, financing, and cross-border transactions remains practically intact. The world seeks to lessen its reliance on the dollar, yet has not found a currency capable of replacing it.
The hegemony of the U.S. dollar is navigating one of its most complex periods in recent decades. The deterioration of U.S. public finances, uncertainty surrounding its economic policy, geopolitical tensions, and the deployment of its financial architecture as an instrument of foreign pressure have reignited the debate over the prudence of maintaining such elevated dependency on the currency.
The discussion is no longer confined to foreign exchange markets; it now involves central banks, sovereign governments, institutional allocators, and major corporations seeking to diversify assets and mitigate exposures tied to the U.S. currency. However, there is a fundamental distinction between questioning its leadership and possessing the capacity to replace it.
The data
The data demonstrates an ongoing diversification process, though it remains far from constituting a definitive displacement. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the dollar’s share of allocated foreign exchange reserves reported by central banks declined to 56.70% during Q2 2026, compared to 57.18% in the previous quarter. The euro, meanwhile, expanded its share to 20.60%, while the Chinese renminbi stood at 2.11%. Aggregate global foreign exchange reserves reached $13.22T. The historical comparison is even more striking: at the turn of the century, the U.S. currency accounted for roughly 71% of global reserves. The long-term trajectory points toward reduced concentration, though not necessarily toward the substitution of the dollar by another dominant currency.
Several factors drive this dynamic. One primary driver is the growing concern among certain governments regarding the exposure of their sovereign reserves to foreign policy decisions originating in Washington. The freezing of Russian assets following the invasion of Ukraine highlighted that international reserve holdings are not entirely insulated from geopolitical conflict.
For select countries, diversification also means mitigating vulnerabilities to financial sanctions, restrictions on payment network access, and potential disruptions to trade corridors. Added to this is the pursuit of greater monetary autonomy, particularly among emerging markets seeking to broaden the use of local currencies in bilateral trade. Nevertheless, interpreting every trade settlement executed in yuan, euros, or local currencies as an unequivocal signal of dollar abandonment would be inaccurate, as many transactions simply serve to lower currency conversion costs rather than execute a deliberate strategy to supplant the prevailing monetary order.
The paradox
The paradox becomes apparent when observing the mechanics of global capital markets. While the dollar’s share of sovereign reserves experiences a gradual decline, its presence in foreign exchange turnover remains overwhelming. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey for April 2025 recorded an average daily foreign exchange trading volume of $9.6T.
The U.S. currency was on one side of 89% of all transactions, far exceeding the euro at 28.9% and the Japanese yen at 16.8%. Because every foreign exchange transaction involves 2 currencies, these individual shares sum to 200%. This data reveals that, even when a transaction does not directly involve the United States, the dollar continues to serve as an intermediary vehicle currency facilitating exchanges between diverse currency pairs. Its preeminence, therefore, does not rely exclusively on the domestic economic output of the United States, but on the entrenched financial plumbing engineered around it.
Another foundational element underpinning its resilience is the sheer depth and liquidity of U.S. capital markets. U.S. Treasuries, setting aside debates concerning fiscal deficits and debt expansion, continue to constitute one of the largest pools of tradable assets on the planet. For a central bank or reserve manager, identifying an alternative currency is insufficient; the allocator requires deep secondary markets, predictable legal frameworks, unconstrained capital mobility, and the capacity to liquidate massive positions into cash without triggering severe price dislocations.
The euro commands a substantial share, but lacks a single, integrated sovereign debt market comparable in scale and liquidity to U.S. Treasuries. China has accelerated the internationalization of the renminbi, yet capital controls and managed exchange-rate mechanisms continue to constrain its viability as a fully convertible reserve asset. Diversification does not equate to the presence of a viable substitute.
International demand for U.S. financial assets provides another dimension of this dynamic. Department of the Treasury data indicates that foreign investors conducted net purchases of long-term U.S. securities totaling $300.7B during August 2026.
Of that sum, $257.8B originated from private investors and $42.9B from foreign official institutions. While these figures do not imply that every allocated dollar represents a structural bet on the currency itself, they demonstrate that the U.S. market continues to attract foreign capital on a massive scale. The currency may navigate cyclical depreciations and structural scrutiny regarding its long-term stability, yet sustained institutional demand for dollar-denominated assets provides fundamental support for its global standing.
On de-dollarization
Within this landscape, de-dollarization should be characterized as a gradual diversification process rather than an imminent rupture. China has expanded bilateral trade settlement agreements in renminbi, the BRICS bloc has explored frameworks to lower reliance on the U.S. banking system, and central banks have scaled sovereign gold allocations.
However, these initiatives have yet to establish an alternative monetary architecture matching the scale, liquidity, and intermediation capacity of the dollar. Even gold, despite its resurgence as a reserve asset, cannot independently perform the functions of a global transactional currency required to finance trade, clear contracts, extend credit, and mobilize capital at institutional scale. The baseline scenario is not the collapse of the dollar, but an increasingly multi-currency system with expanded operational space for secondary currencies.
For emerging markets, and Latin America in particular, this transition entails implications that extend beyond theoretical debates over future monetary hegemony. A weaker dollar can shift cross-border capital flows, external borrowing conditions, commodity valuations, and regional export competitiveness.
Yet dollar depreciation does not inherently guarantee more accommodative financial conditions: if driven by a deterioration in institutional credibility, wider risk premia, or fiscal strain, it could trigger heightened volatility across equity and fixed-income markets. For economies such as Mexico, structurally linked to the United States through trade and corporate financing, dollar dynamics will remain decisive for capital allocation decisions, central bank policy, and institutional hedging strategies.
The underlying paradox is that the dollar does not require an appreciating exchange rate to preserve its dominance. Its standing is fortified by high switching costs, network effects, market liquidity, and the absence of a competitor possessing its structural characteristics.
The United States may face institutional and fiscal vulnerabilities, and global allocators may continue to broaden reserve and transactional exposures. Yet until an alternative economy offers a capital market of comparable depth, openness, unrestricted convertibility, and institutional trust, the dollar will remain anchored at the core of the international financial architecture. Its throne faces growing scrutiny, but it remains without a visible successor.
The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index stood, in the week of the midterm elections, at the lower support of the consolidation band that has contained its gains since August. As already happened in 2025, after the commercial launch of DeepSeek at the beginning of the year, Liberation Day, or the fears about circular financing in November, doubts around artificial intelligence were resurfacing, and with them, the fear of an imminent bursting of the bubble. The first reading of the election result was positive: on Wednesday, the United States stock market recorded its best session since the summer, and the hyperscalers rebounded strongly, decoupling from semiconductors and from the industrial subsectors tied to data center construction, which were more heavily penalized by the forcefulness of the Democratic victory.
The euphoria lasted one day. On Thursday, the market focused on what the Democratic majority could mean for the pace and cost of rolling out artificial intelligence infrastructure. The S&P 500 fell 4.4%, its worst session since April 2025, while the Nasdaq Composite lost 5.5% and entered a correction. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index plunged 12%, the VIX rose nearly 70%, to 28 points, and all eleven sectors of the S&P 500 closed in negative territory. Added to the regulatory fear were some weak results in the semiconductor sector. The most visible catalyst was Texas, one of the country’s major data center hubs: the governor-elect, Gina Hinojosa, has pledged to freeze all new approvals until the legislature passes specific regulation in 2027, extending the pause that Abbott had already decreed in August.
In our judgment, the move is more of a forced liquidation than a break in the thesis. Hedge funds had been cutting their gross exposure since June, by more than 8%, the largest deleveraging since at least 2017, according to Morgan Stanley, and when leverage is withdrawn, you sell what you can, not what you want. That many artificial intelligence beneficiaries already show declines of more than 20% from their highs seems disproportionate to us, given fundamentals that, for now, continue to improve. Nor do we anticipate a slowdown in artificial intelligence development or a national moratorium on data centers, which would put at risk the technological race with China and productivity growth. The news flow may get worse before it gets better, and deleveraging episodes are rarely resolved in a single session. But history is on our side: since 1950, the S&P 500 has traded higher twelve months after every midterm election. As we explain below, neither the bubble thesis nor the regulatory impact on computing supply justifies, in our judgment, the magnitude of the adjustment.
Bubble? Artificial Intelligence Adoption Still Has A Long Way To Go
Although the artificial intelligence investment cycle is advancing (the free cash flow of the hyperscalers is already in negative territory in most cases) and, unlike in 2025, the Federal Reserve is in the middle of a mini-cycle of rate hikes, interest rates have pressured multiples, which are much more reasonable than in 1999. Moreover, the recent correction has conveyed skepticism and caution toward a disruptive technology, not optimism, which dismantles, at least for the moment, the bubble hypothesis.
Investment as a percentage of gross domestic product may be frightening in its magnitude (it has already surpassed the peak reached in the internet era), but the adoption of the technology still has a long way to go. To confirm this, we look at data from Ramp AI (which only counts those who use paid services, but focuses on a universe of just 85,000 companies and whose sample is biased toward technology and growing companies) and from the United States Census Bureau (BTOS), a much broader survey that incorporates up to 1.2 million companies, but only asks about use, which may include free services. Ramp serves us to analyze the pace of growth and which laboratories gain or lose market share. The BTOS is the best measure of how far the use of artificial intelligence tools has penetrated the business fabric, although it is published with a delay and is biased toward small and medium-sized businesses.
Nevertheless, the conclusion coincides in both cases: in September, the Ramp index shows a penetration of 55.9%, while the BTOS survey ranges between 17% and 20% (among companies with more than 250 employees it reaches 37%). Outside the realm of surveys, which always present biases, Anthropic’s S-1 that we referred to last week showed that Fortune 500 companies devote less than 0.1% of their total spending to Claude.
Since 2025, and also according to Ramp data, spending per employee on artificial intelligence applications has multiplied by six, although it has only really begun to accelerate in the last ten months. The effect of these tools on productivity, as well as their reflection in the profits of the large hyperscalers, is evident in this chart.
Demand For Computing Power Continues To Exceed Supply
As we explained last week, there is clear evidence that demand for computing power continues to strengthen and, for the moment, exceeds supply. The hourly rental price of Nvidia’s H100 (Hopper generation), with one-year contracts, has risen 60% in the last year, and that of the Blackwell has also become more expensive.
If a server with extremely expensive accelerators quickly stops being profitable for training frontier models or for offering truly competitive inference prices, the return on invested capital of that investment is compromised. In addition, the release cadence of increasingly powerful chips has increased. The other side of the coin is that, to stay at the forefront of this race and gain market share with more competitive prices in artificial intelligence services without sacrificing margin, you have to invest in cutting-edge technology. An Nvidia GB300 NVL72 rack processes about 6,000 tokens per second on each of the 72 graphics processing units it incorporates, compared to about 90 with the previous generation (Hopper); that is, about 65 times more. The new Vera Rubin, which will begin shipping in volume shortly, multiplies the capacity of the GB300 by between 2.5 and 3.5 times (about 15,000 tokens per second), although, adjusted for power consumption per watt, the improvement would be 1.3 to 1.6 times.
In addition, token usage is growing beyond the demand provided by the large artificial intelligence laboratories (Anthropic and OpenAI). Recent data show us that demand from artificial intelligence agents has already surpassed that of traditional users and has grown 14 times since February. Along the same lines, the use of mixture-of-experts models also increases the token load, and open models, which are cheaper, are being used more and more. The falling cost of tokens stimulates more intensive use of the models and drives up demand for computing power.
It is feasible that, as supply bottlenecks are cleared, the rental price of graphics processing units will fall more in line with their depreciation rate and with the launch of more powerful units. But we are not there yet. In the meantime, there is computing capacity contracted at spot prices per megawatt that will have to be revised upward in 2027-2028 (the contracts of AWS, Google, or Azure with Anthropic do not publish price terms, but CoreWeave’s 10-K states that the weighted average duration of its contracts is about 5 years).
The “Blue Wave” And Data Centers
The holding of the legislative elections in the United States removes one unknown to be resolved ahead of the close of 2026, and the strength of the “Blue Wave” exceeded the expectations of specialists and bookmakers. The speed at which Trump has consumed his political capital in his second term is surprising and has a lot to do with not having addressed the main concern of those who voted for him in 2024: inflation and the domestic economy. On the contrary, Trump embarked on a capricious and poorly explained war and on the imposition of high tariffs even on allied nations aligned with American commercial interests. It is an almost unprecedented defeat, in which Trump has lost control of Republican “fortress states,” such as North Carolina (the first time since 2008 that it has elected a Democrat to the Senate), Texas, or Florida (where Republicans have lost seats despite redrawing the electoral districts to their convenience). This result, a priori, and because of what it implies for the 2028 presidential elections (with new Democratic governors in states such as Ohio or Iowa, historic “swing states” that had passed into Republican control), reduces the risk of a new attack on Iran and shifts the focus of geopolitics toward the Federal Reserve and the sustainability of the earnings-per-share growth cycle.
With results that are still provisional (at the time of writing, the results in Arizona, Oregon, Michigan, or Minnesota were still to be known), and as we see in the chart above, the electoral upheaval will also put the focus on the evolution of data centers under development and in the planning phase, as well as on possible delays affecting the supply of computing power. Opposition to the construction of data centers was seen in both red and blue states, with Republicans such as Abbott, who had already paralyzed new approvals in Texas in August. Nevertheless, the Democratic sweep sharpens the situation.
Texas (Democrat, Hinojosa), Georgia (Democrat, Bottoms), Ohio (Democrat, Acton), and Iowa (Democrat, Sand), in addition to Virginia (which passed into Democratic hands in 2025) and Pennsylvania, concentrate the bulk of the gigawatts planned and under construction: 189.5 gigawatts of the roughly 346 gigawatts projected.
In Pennsylvania (Shapiro), the developer must build, bring in, or buy its own power generation. In Ohio (Acton), the moratorium would be conditional: only data centers that pay for their energy and water and demonstrate that they do not raise their neighbors’ bills would be approved. In Virginia (Spanberger), a tax of 0.011 dollars per kilowatt-hour has been introduced, about 77 million dollars per year per gigawatt, with a load factor of 80%, while maintaining the sales tax exemption for equipment. Georgia (Bottoms) is the harshest case: it calls for a statewide pause and a review of the 2.5 billion dollars in tax incentives.
Nevertheless, the impact in 2026-2027 will be very low: in the four main states there are 25.9 gigawatts already under construction that would not be affected by a regulatory change, and Trump has already promised to become “Mr. Veto,” so he will possibly block any Democratic attempt at the federal level to increase the tax burden or tighten regulation on the construction of data centers.
If the White House passes into Democratic hands in 2028, the uncertainty will affect the 108.9 gigawatts planned in those states. In a base scenario, with subjective probabilities for each of them, around 10-15 gigawatts could be delayed. The effect would not be very significant: adjustments in state legislation would mean obstacles (unions, environmental requirements, and restrictions on electricity consumption), but not bans on construction.
The final idea: the electoral outcome increases the value of already installed computing capacity and should also sustain the hourly rental cost of graphics processing units and accelerators. Additionally, it could be the perfect excuse to slow the pace of investment. The hyperscalers are clear beneficiaries.
The financial services sector has entered a decisive phase of its technological transformation. According to Capgemini’s World Cloud Report for Financial Services 2027, based on a large-scale survey of 1,100 executives in 14 international markets, what began as one-off automation projects is rapidly evolving into ecosystems of interconnected artificial intelligence agents capable of coordinating workflows, making decisions, and executing autonomous actions across the business. However, the report warns that the distance between ambition and real execution is deep: the proliferation of fragmented initiatives, legacy operating models, and siloed governance keep the vast majority of institutions trapped in pilot phases.
The Leap From Isolated Pilots To Multi-Agent Orchestration
The recent trajectory shows a dizzying but uneven pace of adoption. Whereas in 2025, 80% of institutions began designing or testing individual agents for specific efficiency tasks, 59% now say they are testing or deploying multi-agent systems in production within limited functions. However, only 10% of firms have achieved enterprise-wide multi-agent orchestration capable of sustaining fully autonomous business execution.
This transition goes far beyond marginal productivity gains. Agent ecosystems are beginning to reshape high-volume operational flows in banking and insurance, such as customer service, policy underwriting, claims management, and compliance operations. At the same time, user interaction is moving toward an intermediated model: 76% of senior executives expect artificial intelligence agents to become a key component of customer relationships within three years. Despite this momentum, Capgemini’s assessment through its maturity index, which measures dimensions such as deployment, trust, cloud authority, security, and operational discipline, finds that only an exclusive 5% of financial sector institutions currently have comprehensive enterprise maturity.
Three Strategic Priorities To Lead In The Agentic Era
The study, produced by the Capgemini Research Institute and presented by Kartik Ramakrishnan, chief executive officer of the firm’s Financial Services Strategic Business Unit, stresses that market leaders will not be defined by how many bots they deploy, but by how they orchestrate their autonomous execution, govern it at scale, and turn it into tangible results. To close the operational gap, the report identifies three key priorities:
It is vitally important to move beyond isolated use cases and integrate agents that span operations, the technology infrastructure, and customer journeys. In this regard, 44% of the executives surveyed already prioritize building “agentic meshes” to link scattered pilots with corporate execution. Likewise, firms are recalibrating their sourcing strategy: building in-house what generates strategic differentiation, buying standard solutions for generic needs, and partnering in ecosystems where shared data provides differential value.
The cloud is shifting from a simple provider of computing capacity to becoming the execution authority for autonomous systems, acting as the data spine, control plane, and governance fabric. When selecting cloud providers, regulatory requirements, data residency, and compliance certifications lead executives’ priorities (50%), followed by security and identity management (47%) and auditability or traceability at scale (39%). Moreover, sovereignty goes beyond the mere location of data: it covers direct control over who authorizes and executes agents’ decisions, a critical aspect given that 62% of firms acknowledge that their identity and access management infrastructure lacks the resilience required to operate continuously in autonomous environments.
As agentic workflows expand, pressure mounts to justify investments with quantifiable business returns. The report reveals a severe lack of financial discipline: 48% of companies cannot consistently demonstrate the return on investment of their agentic artificial intelligence initiatives, while 51% lack mature valuation filters (value gates) to authorize continued funding of projects. In response, the most advanced organizations are directly linking artificial intelligence spending and token consumption to concrete operational goals, establishing strict economic governance and shared accountability in the profit and loss statement.
