Foto: Sander van der Wel
. Byron Wien predice las 10 sorpresas que nos puede dar 2017
Byron R. Wien, vicepresidente de inversión en multiactivos de Blackstone, ha publicado –como cada año, desde hace 32– su lista de 10 sorpresas para 2017. La serie de “sorpresas” económicas, financieras y políticas, eventos a los que un inversor promedio sólo asignaría un 33% de probabilidades de que ocurra, pero al que Byron atribuye una probabilidad superior al 50%, es la siguiente:
Todavía reflexionando sobre su pérdida del voto popular, Donald Trump promete ganar a los que se opongan a él hasta 2020. Se aleja de sus posiciones más extremas sobre practicamente todos los temas para consternación de algunos leales derechistas. Insiste: «Los votantes me eligieron a mí, no una ideología». Sus acciones unilaterales provocan agitación en el gobierno. Prácticamente todos los tratados y acuerdos que se comprometió a romper en su primer día en el poder se modifican, no se destrozan. Su papelera se queda vacía.
La combinación de las reducciones impositivas a corporaciones e individuos, los acuerdos comerciales más constructivos, el desmantelamiento de la regulación financiera y energética y los incentivos fiscales a las infraestructuras empujan la tasa de crecimiento real de la economía estadounidense de 2017 por encima del 3%. La productividad mejora por primera vez desde 2014.
Las beneficios operativos del Standard & Poor’s 500 son de 130 dólares en 2017 y el índice sube hasta los 2.500 puntos, con los inversores convencidos de que la economía estadounidense está en una trayectoria de crecimiento a largo plazo. Los temores sobre un déficit presupuestario creciente se mantienen en un segundo plano.
Los inversores macro se forran por las fluctuaciones monetarias. El yen japonés se sitúa en 130 frente al dólar, estimulando sus exportaciones. A medida que Brexit se acerca, la libra esterlina cae a 1,10 frente al dólar, provocando un aumento en el turismo y la especulación inmobiliaria. El euro cae por debajo de par frente al dólar.
El mayor crecimiento económico, la inflación acercándose al 3%, y la renovada demanda de capital empujan los tipos de interés. El rendimiento del Tesoro estadounidense a 10 años se aproxima al 4%.
El populismo se extiende por Europa afectando las elecciones en Francia y Alemania. Angela Merkel pierde las elecciones de septiembre. En toda Europa, el electorado cuestiona la utilidad de la Unión Europea y, a finales de año, se discuten activamente planes para cerrarla, abandonar el euro y volver a las monedas nacionales.
La reducción de las regulaciones en la industria energética conlleva un aumento en la producción estadounidense. Irán e Irak también aumentan su producción. El aumento de la oferta mantiene el precio de West Texas Intermediate por debajo de 60 dólares la mayor parte del año a pesar del aumento de la demanda mundial.
Donald Trump se da cuenta de que se ha equivocado con respecto a China. Su moneda está sobrevalorada, no infravalorada, y se deprecia hasta ocho por dólar. Su economía florece gracias al gasto de los consumidores en bienes producidos localmente y las mayores exportaciones. Trump evita tarifas punitivas para prevenir una guerra comercial y desarrolla una relación más colaborativa con la segunda economía más grande del mundo.
Beneficiándose de un mayor crecimiento en China y Estados Unidos, el crecimiento real en Japón supera el 2% por primera vez en décadas y su mercado de valores lidera la apreciación anual entre los mercados desarrollados.
Oriente Próximo se enfría. Donald Trump y su secretario de Estado, Rex Tillerson, trabajando con Vladimir Putin, finalmente negocian un alto el fuego permanente en Siria. ISIS disminuye significativamente su amenaza en Medio Oriente. Bashar al-Assad permanece mantiene el poder.
Además, cada año hay una serie de temas adicionales a la lista de 10 sorpresas que Byron R. Wien no incluye en esta, bien porque no cree que sean tan relevantes como los anteriores o porque no los considera probables. De cara a 2017, esto son:
Habiendose cansado de Washington después de un año en la presidencia, Donald Trump mueve la Casa Blanca a Nueva York, de abril a diciembre, y a Palm Beach, de enero a marzo. Hace viajes diarios al Capitolio en el Air Force One para temas legislativos y diplomáticos.
El partido demócrata está dividido en cuanto a su estrategia, con Bernie Sanders y Elizabeth Warren defendiendo un cambio hacia la izquierda y otros que quieren permanecer en el centro. La falta de liderazgo da lugar a una especulación generalizada sobre sonadas pérdidas en las elecciones parlamentarias de 2018.
Las tácticas de intimidación de Donald Trump se muestran eficaces desalentando a las compañías a trasladar instalaciones manufactureras fuera de los Estados Unidos, pero no logra crear puestos de trabajo. La diferencia de salarios es demasiado grande. Esto se convierte en su decepción más grande del primer año.
La primera gran confrontación internacional de Trump viene, sin grandes sorpresas, de Corea del Norte. Kim Jong-un amenaza con lanzar una bomba nuclear en medio del Pacífico, llamándola «una prueba». Los asesores de Trump tratan de frenar sus deseos de castigar severamente al país.
La India vuelve llamar la atención de los inversores. Su economía crece al 7% y los beneficios corporativos de las empresas allí establecidas son sólidos. Su mercado de valores lidera a los de otros grandes países emergentes, junto con China.
Los esfuerzos de Trump para eliminar el acuerdo con Irán fracasan. El resto de países firmantes creen que la producción iraní de armas nucleares se ha restringido y obligan a Estados Unidos a mantener su palabra.
Foto: ƝƖƇƠ ƬƖMΣ ™
. Los inversores prefieren los fondos de acciones que de bonos
Los inversores cerraron el año favoreciendo los fondos de gestión pasiva de renta variable estadounidense sobre aquellos gestionados activamente, por una diferencia récord tras asignar a fondos pasivos cerca de 50.800 millones de dólares en diciembre, según el informe correspondiente al último mes del año de Morningstar. En lo que a gestión activa se refiere, los inversores sacaron 23.000 millones de fondos de renta variable de EE.UU. durante el mes. Para estimar el flujo neto de los fondos Morningsar calcula el cambio en los activos no explicado por el comportamiento del fondo, y en el caso de los ETFs calculando el cambio en las acciones en circulación.
Según la firma, en el mes de diciembre las preferencias de los inversores han cambiado para favorecer a los fondos de acciones sobre los fondos de bonos, en medio del creciente optimismo sobre la economía de los Estados Unidos y el continuo aumento de tipos e inflación. Las entradas globales a fondos de renta variable estadounidense alcanzaron su máximo mensual desde abril de 2000, con 27.800 millones de dólares, mientras los fondos de bonos tributables registraron entradas netas totales de 14.600.
En diciembre de 2016 se registraron salidas totales de estrategias alternativas por valor de 4.400 millones de dólares, con lo que el acumulado de salidas anuales es de 4.700 millones de dólares, lo que supone el peor resultado para fondos alternativos desde 2005 y un cambio significativo con respecto a 2015 cuando las entradas netas fueron de 13.300 millones.
Las tendencias de diciembre también mostraron que los fondos de préstamos bancarios lideraron los flujos de entrada, pues sumaron 6.0000 millones en las activas y 1.400 millones en las estrategias pasivas, manteniendo la reciente tendencia a interesarse por estos fondos.
Vanguard dominó el panorama de los flujos en 2016. La firma cerró el año con entradas netas por valor de 277.000 millones, hasta 3.4 billones en activos a largo plazo. American Funds vio como 4.900 millones salían de su gestión activa en 2016, mientras que Fidelity Investments compensó parte de la sangría en la parte activa con 37.200 millones que entraron el la gestión pasiva.
Entre los fondos índice y ETFs, el ETF SPDR S & P 500 fue el que recibió la mayor cantidad de activos (14.300 millones) en diciembre de 2016, seguidos por tres fondos Vanguard con ofertas para acciones estadounidenses, internacionales y bonos estadounidenses.
PIMCO Income lidera las entradas como fondo individual activo, pues sumó 1.500 millones de dólares en diciembre y 13.700 millones de dólares a lo largo de 2016. El Franklin Federal Tax Free Income dio la vuelta a las salidas de capital en diciembre, registrando entradas de 1.400 millones de dólares.
2017—China’s banks are increasingly exposed to policy and other risks, but a crisis is not imminent, S&P Global Ratings said in its report, «Is This The Year For A Chinese Banking Crisis?»
«A banking crisis is likely to be avoided yet again in 2017, in light of another year of GDP growth exceeding 6%, and a change in the credit mix to relieve asset quality. However, the current trajectory is not sustainable,» said S&P Global Ratings credit analyst Qiang Liao.
Credit growth in China has surpassed economic growth for several years running, a dynamic that is gradually depleting Chinese banks’ once-ample funding bases. While overall deposit levels still exceed outstanding credits, the banking sector’s funding and liquidity buffers are thinning.
In 2016, Chinese banks accelerated their lending to the public sector and households, as new loans to the riskier corporate sector slowed. This change in the debt mix has helped keep a lid on nonperforming loans as a proportion of the total. However overall economic leverage continues to rise, diminishing funding buffers and making banks more vulnerable to tail risks.
«Crisis or not, we maintain and re-emphasize our negative credit outlook on China’s banking sector,» said Liao.
«Tail risks for Chinese bank credit profiles include policy risks related to China’s exchange rate, shadow banking, local government debt and corporate bond defaults, a property market correction, and external shocks,» Liao added. There is wide divergence of credit quality within the banking sector.
«We believe public confidence in China’s smaller institutions is much lower than for the megabanks and national banks. It’s not yet apparent if the smaller banks could withstand a stress event, such as a run on deposits,» said Liao.
«Given that many of the smaller Chinese banks are still aggressively expanding credit, and may lack sophisticated risk management, they are more likely to be caught off guard if market conditions rapidly weaken,» Mr. Liao added.
The article notes that smaller Chinese banks are still aggressively expanding credit, but may lack the sophisticated risk management to cope should market conditions rapidly weaken.
We get a lot of questions on how gold will perform in 2017. While we have no crystal ball, we thought the tidbit below might be of interest to you as you evaluate whether adding a gold component might provide valuable diversification to your portfolio.
Since Nixon took the US dollar off the gold standard in 1971 there have been seven Presidential transition years, i.e., years when a new president was inaugurated. Those years were 1974, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1993, 2001, and 2009.
Looking at the data, gold achieved above average returns during those calendar years, +14.8% in Presidential transition years vs an overall average of +8.4%. Perhaps equally important is that those have been years when the S&P 500 greatly underperformed its average over that same time period, -0.9% in Presidential transition years vs an overall average of +9.0%.
The S&P 500 on average was negative for those seven calendar years of Presidential transition. The average return in Presidential transition years is +14.8% for gold and -0.9% for the S&P 500.
One possible theory as to why this might make sense is policy disappointment of a new incoming administration, the high hopes of the newly elected administration may be tougher to achieve in practice, leading to weakness in equity markets. In addition to policy disappointment may be a general sense of policy uncertainty as the rules of the game potentially change under a new administration, which might boost gold as a safe haven.
One caveat is that seven transitions is a small sample size; the reason we limit ourselves to transitions since 1971 is because before gold was pegged to the dollar in one form or another for much of US history.
Foto: Alexas_Fotos. Los inversores globales aumentaron sus posiciones en efectivo durante diciembre
La encuesta a administradores de fondos de BofA Merrill Lynch de enero encuentra que los inversionistas se preparan para un crecimiento e inflación más fuertes, pero siguen renuentes a recortar el efectivo.“Con miras a la toma de protesta de la nueva administración en Estados Unidos, los inversionistas están posicionados para un mejor crecimiento e inflación, pero no están listos para volverse completamente optimistas dados los riesgos relacionados con China en el horizonte”, dijo Michael Hartnett, estratega en jefe de Inversiones de BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research.
Manish Kabra, estratega de Renta Variable Cuantitativa en Europa, añadió que “los administradores de fondos han regresado a Europa, en el contexto de una mejora en la perspectiva macro, pero el Reino Unido se mantiene como la región con opiniones más desfavorecedoras”.
“El tipo de cambio USD/KPY y las acciones japonesas han sido adquiridas como activos inflacionarios”, destacó Shusuke Yamada, estratega en Jefe de Divisas y Renta Variable japonesa. “Ya sea que la tendencia del mercado post-electoral se reacelera o se relaja, es muy probable que estas dos clases de activos estén entre las más impactadas”.
Otros hallazgos de la Encuesta:
Las expectativas de los inversionistas respecto al crecimiento mundial aumentaron a niveles máximos en 19 meses (59% neto desde el 35% neto de noviembre), mientras las expectativas de inflación global están en el segundo nivel más alto en más de 12 años (84% neto desde el 85% neto del mes pasado).
Las expectativas del crecimiento global de los inversionistas mejoran a máximos de dos años (62% neto desde 57% neto en diciembre), mientras las expectativas de inflación se mantienen altas, con la quinta lectura más alta registrada (83% neto de un 84% neto el mes pasado).
El porcentaje de inversionistas esperando crecimiento e inflación “por encima de la tendencia” se encuentra en un máximo de cinco años y medio (17%, comparado a un 12% en diciembre).
Los inversionistas siguen identificando el dólar a largo plazo como la cotización más concurrida (47%), mientras el porcentaje más alto desde abril de 2003 cree que el Euro está subvaluado (13% neto).
Este mes, la encuesta registró un gran salto en el porcentaje de inversionistas que esperan que los ingresos corporativos aumenten 10% o más en los próximos 12 meses (mejoró de -22%, comparado a -47% el mes anterior), la lectura más optimista desde junio de 2014.
Sin embargo, los niveles de efectivo se incrementaron a 5,1% desde 4,8% en diciembre, muy por encima del promedio de 10 años de 4,5%.
Los riesgos de cola citados más comúnmente son el proteccionismo/guerra anti comercio (29%), erróneas políticas de Estados Unidos (24%) y una devaluación de la divisa china (15%).
En enero, los inversionistas mencionaron su interés en adquirir renta variable y ETFs de la eurozona y de sectores tecnológicos, y al mismo tiempo vender industriales, renta variable de mercados emergentes y materias primas.
La colocación de renta variable en la eurozona se incrementó fuertemente a un 17% neto de opiniones favorables, desde un 1% de opiniones desfavorecedoras.
La colocación en renta variable de Japón se mantiene sin cambios desde diciembre, a un 21% neto de opinión favorecedora, pero todavía hay espacio para aumentar el optimismo.
In closing a year of remarkable geopolitical events, there are still many unknowns that will only be revealed when the dust settles from the major elections and referendums across the globe. Natixis Global Asset Management and one of its leading affiliates focused on alternatives, AlphaSimplex Group, LLC. talk about volatility Ahead.
Downside risk is currently elevated at above average, appoints the firm, although not at extreme levels for international and emerging market stocks. For U.S. stocks, the measure is slightly below average. This may seem counter-intuitive given the modest gains delivered by stocks thus far in 2016 and the relatively positive market reaction to the U.S. presidential election results. But perhaps it isn’t all that surprising.
Recall the rollercoaster stock market of the first quarter of 2016, when investors became concerned about the slowdown in Chinese economic growth. Almost a year later, points out Natixis affliates, the health of the Chinese economy continues to be a global risk. Add to that the wildcard of the direction of U.S. and Chinese trade relations post-election. Other concerns weighing on global markets include rising interest rates in the U.S., a weak European recovery weighed down by immigration complexities and a refugee crisis. Mid-year, Brexit also added a pint of uncertainty to the world order.
“Against this backdrop, it appears the only certainty is persistent uncertainty. This uncertainty has contributed to a relatively wild ride in the U.S. stock markets over the year, where we have seen a trough to peak move in the S&P 500 Index of over 20%.2 While we do not view global equity risk at extreme levels, we do believe investors should proceed with caution”, conclude AlphaSimplex Group´s team.
The surprise election of Donald Trump has the potential to significantly reshape the United States’ domestic policy landscape and the country’s relationship with the world. In the latest edition of Global Outlook, Chief Economist Jeremy Lawson examines the trajectory of global growth and the possible economic implications of a Trump presidency.
The incoming president will inherit a supportive economic backdrop. Prior to the election, we saw increasing evidence that global activity had been improving. Stronger nominal growth also means a return to positive corporate profit growth and we are anticipating that this will continue to improve over the next 12 months.
Standard Life Investments believes there are a number of factors that will determine whether the first year of a Trump presidency amplifies the current trends or results in a change of direction. Significant factors would include an aggressive loosening of fiscal policy, a dismantling of President Obama’s domestic agenda and reorientation of American foreign and international trade policy.
Jeremy commented: “The near-term pro-growth aspects of the policy package promised by Donald Trump have been welcomed by investors after such a disappointing recovery from the financial crisis. The return of Republican majorities in the House and Senate should help to reduce the political stasis in Washington, particularly regarding fiscal stimulus where the President-elect and his party have the most common ground. A raw fiscal stimulus of more than 1% of GDP in 2018 is possible, which could lift growth a touch above 3%. This is almost a whole percentage point higher than our forecasts without stimulus. In turn, stronger US growth would have knock-on benefits for import demand from the rest of the world, though it would also be pulling future growth forward and probably bring higher Fed policy rates with it.»
He added that “other than tighter monetary policy and a stronger dollar, the biggest macro and market downside risks from a Trump presidency arguably derive from his trade agenda – such as his pledges to withdraw from the Trans-pacific Partnership, declare China a currency manipulator and lift tariffs. A new era of protectionism would be negative for the global economy. Hence the importance of identifying Trump’s real intentions as President. We believe the most likely scenario is that heightened rhetoric is ultimate used to secure better access to foreign markets for US companies and incentives to keep production at home. However, the views of Trump’s nominees for key trade policy roles in his administration shows that there is a significant risk that Trump means what he says.»
“Ultimately, America is not the only source of political risk for the global economy; Europe also faces a number of political challenges. Destabilising outcomes would likely reinforce the peripheral European spread widening that has already taken place recently amid speculation that the ECB backstop has become more equivocal, though we doubt policymakers would stand still in the face of movements that threatened to undermine four years of policy and economic repair.” Lawson concludes.
The European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), in cooperation with SWIFT, published a new report about the evolution of automation and standardisation rates of fund orders received by transfer agents (TAs) in the cross-border fund centres of Luxembourg and Ireland during the first half of 2016.
The report is an on-going campaign by EFAMA and SWIFT to highlight the advancement of automation and standardisation rates of orders of cross-border funds. 29 TAs from Ireland and Luxembourg participated in this survey. The report also provides data on standardisation levels in Italy and Germany.
According to the report, the total volume processed by the 29 survey participants reached 16.6 million orders by end of June 2016. The total automation rate of processed orders of cross-border funds reached 84.4% in the second quarter of 2016, compared to 85.4% in the fourth quarter of 2015. The use of ISO messaging standards decreased from 51.2% in Q4 2015 to 50% in Q2 2016, while the use of manual processes rose to 15.6% in Q2 2016 compared to 14.6% in Q4 2015.
The total automation rate of orders processed by Luxembourg TAs reached 81.7% in the second quarter of 2016 compared to 82.9% in the last quarter of 2015. The ISO automation rate decreased from 65% in Q4 2015 to 63.8% in Q2 2016, while the use of proprietary ftp remains stable at 17.9%.
The total automation rate of orders processed by Luxembourg TAs reached 81.7% in the second quarter of 2016 compared to 82.9% in the last quarter of 2015.
Peter De Proft, EFAMA Director General, notes: “The report confirms that further increases in automation rate levels for fund orders and switches towards the ISO 20022 standard will depend on the efforts made not only by fund managers to adapt their technology and operational structures, but also by the fund distributors sending the fund orders.”
Fabian Vandenreydt, Global Head of Securities, Innotribe and the SWIFT Institute, SWIFT, adds: “With funds order volumes stabilising across Luxemburg and Ireland, it is not surprising to see the automation rates level off as well. Over the years we have seen a consistent increase with automation and adoption of ISO 20022 compared to proprietary formats. The industry has made great progress and with near 85 percent of the market fully automated, the funds industry is in a good place to continue driving efficiency in the market.»
CC-BY-SA-2.0, FlickrFoto: Travis Wise. La victoria de Trump es una noticia positiva para la deuda high yield
Since Donald Trump won the presidency and the Republicans, a majority in Congress, the bond markets have priced in a steep rise in fiscal deficits. While it is more or less clear that the new administration will cut taxes drastically, a question mark hovers over the extent of infrastructure spending and, indeed, if such spending will even be approved.
“Congressional Republicans are traditionally opposed to deficits and the issue of public debt has led to political (more than economic) crises in recent years with renegotiations of the debt ceiling (in 2011 and 2013). The issues of US debt and fiscal manoeuvring room will be key to the coming years, and this is therefore a good time to look more deeply into their many facets”, explains Bastien Drut, Strategy and Economic Research at Amundi.
US public debt can be split into two categories, said Drut:
Marketable debt, which is raised on the markets. This is the debt that is traded on the markets each day, including T-bills, T-notes, T-bonds, floating-rate notes, and inflation-linked debt. As of November2016, marketable debt amounted to $13,921bn, or 74.6% of GDP.
Non-marketable debt, which is raised from US governmental bodies. For instance, US law provides that tax receipts levied to fund the Social Security Trust Fund and the Medicare HI Trust Fund must be invested in US Treasuries, most of the time non-marketable US Treasuries. As of November 2016, non-marketable debt came to $5,481bn, or 29.3% of GDP.
The debt ceiling applies – more or less – to the sum of the marketable and non-marketable debts, when the debt ceiling is not suspended (see below).
Marketable debt consists of:
T-bills, of an initial maturity of 4 weeks, 3 months, 6 months or 12 months
T-notes, of an initial maturity of 2, 3, 5, 7 or 10 years
T-bonds, of an initial maturity of 30 years
Floating-rate notes, of an initial maturity of 2 years (these were first issued in 2014)
TIPS, of an initial maturity of 5, 10 or 30 years.
More than 60% of marketable debt is T-notes. After falling precipitously in recent years (after peaking at 34% of marketable debt in 2008), the proportion of T-Bills is being driven back up by the reform of the US money markets (from 10% at and-2015 to 13% today). The expansion of the T-Bill market in 2017 will limit long-dated issuance.
“The average maturity of the US marketable is approximately 5.2 years. It has been rising since 2014. The future Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, indicated in a recent interview that the new administration would “look at potentially extending the maturity of the debt because eventually, [the US] will have higher interest rates and that this is something that this country is going to need to deal with.” He mentioned the possibility to issue 50 or 100 yr bonds”, concludes Drut.
Ever since the Conservative government came to power in 2010, one of its key policy goals has been reducing the annual government deficit to achieve fiscal balance. However, with the change of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in July, a change in fiscal policy could be expected, according to Mike Amey, Head of Sterling Portfolio Management at PIMCO. “The Autumn Statement on 23 November was Chancellor Philip Hammond’s first opportunity to “reset” fiscal policy ‒ and reset he did”.
“Quite correctly, the government recognized that with the deficit at 3%‒4% of GDP, the most important deficit reduction is now behind the UK, and fiscal policy no longer needs to be all about relentless austerity. This seems sensible”.
According to Amey, the reset of policy is most evident in the projections for the deficit in the Autumn Statement compared to the forecasts in the March 2016 budget. “As the graph shows, there is no aspiration to achieve fiscal balance by 2020, the date of the next general election. More broadly, there is a recognition that even a deficit reduction to 2%‒3%, assuming growth remains at or close to current levels, will be enough to put total debt-to-GDP on a stable footing. Given the uncertainties ahead as the UK goes through the Brexit negotiations, significant further tightening of fiscal policy probably seemed unnecessary, and this is the bet the chancellor has made”.
Investors immediately responded to the Autumn Statement by selling gilts, although interestingly, the British pound was little changed against the U.S. dollar. “Our sense is that UK gilts can fall further given that UK growth has already returned to pre-Brexit levels, the supply of UK government bonds is going to be higher than expected and the likelihood of further monetary easing has fallen. However, after a sharp rise in yields already, our preference is to reflect caution on gilts relative to other high quality government bonds rather than by selling outright. All of this also suggests that the yield curve may steepen as the term premium rises on a more balanced outlook for growth and inflation”.
The outlook for the British pound is a little more nuanced, the expert says. “The combination of a high current account deficit and more persistent fiscal deficits may well keep pressure on the pound, although that may turn out to be as much about U.S. dollar strength as pound weakness”.
