Helicopter money refers to the situation where a central bank finances the fiscal expenditure of a government. The government prints money instead of raising taxes or debt to fund spending.
The economic effects of QE are still being debated, but they are presumed to be positive to date. With helicopter money, there would be a direct fiscal expansion financed by central bank purchase of (and cancellation of) government bonds. This direct fiscal spend would be economically expansionary, unless the announcement of helicopter money represented a shock to households and firms that was suficiently significant to offset the fiscal stimulus. The economic effects of fiscal expansion combined with new QE appear identical to those of helicopter money.
The market effect of the recent experience of QE has been lower discount rates, a weaker currency, and a strong environment for risk assets. We might guess that the market’s reaction to helicopter money would be similar, but given that past episodes of dominance by the fiscal authority over the central bank have been associated with fiscal indiscipline and high inflation, there is a reasonable chance that markets could react in a meaningfully different and negative way. The truth is that we just don’t know.
Figure 1 outlines the impacts of QE, of helicopter money (where debt is purchased by the central bank and written-off), and a combination of QE and fiscal expansion. With the unknown market impact of helicopter money, with prospective policy tools in the hands of central banks narrowed through debt cancellation, and with the economic benefits associated with helicopter money rather than straight fiscal expansion de minimis, it is not clear why policymakers will choose the path of helicopter money. Perhaps the real lesson is that monetary policy has its limits and that in the event of an economic slowdown, aggregate demand is best supported by fiscal rather than monetary policy. In the event that new fiscal expansion requires supplemental monetary support in the form of additional QE, this is a decision that could be made at some point in the future.
Helicopter money is often associated with incidence of hyperinflation. In their study of the 56 incidents of world hyperinflation during the last 300 years, Hanke and Krus found hyperinflation to be ‘an economic malady that arises under extreme conditions: war, political mismanagement, and the transition from a command to market-based economy to name a few’. By contrast, monetary financing has been used widely in the developed and developing world over time without ending in hyperinflation.
Until the US Fed Accord in 1951 the US operated a policy of fixing long-term bond yields, and as such increasing or decreasing the amount of reserves in the banking system, depending on private sector demand for these instruments. Canada used monetary financing for 40 years until 1975 under a free-floating exchange rate regime without calamitous macroeconomic effects, and India operated a policy of debt monetisation until 2006. Further examples abound. Indeed, of the 152 central bank legal frameworks analysed by the IMF, 101 permitted monetary financing in 2012. This is not to say that helicopter money is a desirable policy. It would be, in my opinion, a backwards step. But neither is it to be necessarily associated with hyperinflation.
So, in conclusion, helicopter money is not a weird and wacky new form of money. Indeed, once we understand how money works helicopter money looks pretty straightforward. The prospective economic, monetary and fiscal effects of helicopter money (absent the sticker-shock of a new unfamiliar policy being implemented) look identical to a normal fiscal expansion supplemented with additional QE. As such, it could be argued that the UK, US, and Japan have all already effectively experienced helicopter money. It is harder to say the same about the Eurozone, consisting as it does of government entities that are not monetary sovereigns. Indeed, the Eurozone is much more complicated.
Toby Nangle has been the Head of Multi-Asset and Portfolio Manager at Threadneedle Asset Management Limited since January 1, 2012.
