The rate hike and Kevin Warsh’s press conference transmitted a certain sense of calm to equity investors, who now do not see it as likely as in 2022 that the Fed will fall behind the curve. However, the yield on 10- and 30-year government bonds has continued to be volatile and trend upward.
Uncertainty regarding the conflict in Iran and how far it could push oil prices continues to weigh on investor sentiment, encouraging some well-known Wall Street strategists to advocate the similarities between the current cycle and what happened in the early 1960s, Lyndon B. Johnson’s “guns and butter” era.
The analogy with Lyndon Johnson, who simultaneously funded Vietnam and the “Great Society,” rhymes with the current moment. But it rhymes with 1965–68, not the early sixties: a late-cycle economy, at full employment, receiving a fiscal boost when there is no longer any slack.
How does it compare to the current picture? On September 16, the Fed raised rates by 25 bps, to 3.75%–4.00%, the first hike in more than three years. Furthermore, it raised its core PCE forecast for 2026 to 3.4%. It did so even though the Administration actively pressured it to hold back. On the fiscal front, there is an added request of $1.5 trillion for defense, and the CBO projects a deficit of 5.8% of GDP and debt at 101%. The 10-year closed the week of the rate hike at 5%.
What are the similarities with “guns and butter”? Today, as in 1965, an armed conflict and an expansion of public spending coincide with full employment (procyclical fiscal spending, quite heterodox in a historical context): unemployment below 4% then, 4.1% now. The tug-of-war between the White House and the Fed is also repeating itself. In December 1965, Johnson reprimanded Martin, then head of the Fed, at his ranch for raising the discount rate; today the tension is between Trump and Warsh. In the stock market, the concentration in megacaps linked to AI recalls the genesis of the Nifty Fifty, although with much less striking valuations among its main representatives.
But there are also differences; the fiscal aspect plays against us. In 1965, debt hovered around 40% of GDP and was falling. Johnson’s deficit barely reached 3% in 1968. Today, debt is two and a half times higher and growing, so the risk is greater than back then.
Wages play in our favor. What made the inflation of the sixties chronic was the wage spiral, with strong unions and COLA clauses (cost-of-living adjustment clauses) applied to social security payments. Today wages are growing at 3.1% year-on-year, and the post-pandemic trend is clearly downward. Current inflation is largely supply-driven, due to energy and tariffs, and without indexation it can dissipate; this is made clear, for example, by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Finally, there are no similarities regarding the monetary regime either. Bretton Woods and financial repression allowed the adjustment to be postponed until August 1971. Today, with a floating exchange rate and “bond vigilantes” on alert in recent months, the adjustment arrives via the term premium, in a faster and more volatile manner.
And although Warsh acts today like Martin in 1965–66, his speech leaves no doubt regarding the objective of containing and controlling inflation, and thus recovering credibility and confidence in the Federal Reserve. The problem back then was not the rate hike, but what came after: the Fed overestimated the Government’s capacity to raise taxes, and its rate cuts in 1967–68 were miscalculations with the economy already at full employment. The key question is whether the Fed will maintain its focus after the midterms in November; if Trump ultimately loses control of both houses, pressure in Iran could increase significantly.
Scenario Analysis
Trying to add some color, our scenario analysis (with subjective probabilities) would look like this:
1.- “1966 Analogy” (45%). The Fed stands firm and there is a mid-cycle slowdown, similar to the roughly 20% drop in the S&P that year, followed by a recovery.
2.- “1967–68 Analogy” (25%). The Fed yields after the “midterms” and inflation gets stuck above 3%. The term premium rises steadily and a prolonged regime of poor real returns opens up for 60/40 portfolios, like the one that followed between 1966 and 1982.
3.- “AI Productivity” (30%). Capex expands capacity and absorbs the fiscal boost, as in the late nineties.
Implications for Asset Classes
And how does this outlook affect the major asset classes?
Fixed income: Conservative stance on duration relative to the index in US nominals, with a steepening bias on the curve and some protection through inflation-linked bonds. With the 10-year around 5%, we are approaching an interesting area, but the risk of higher oil prices and a more dynamic labor market will weigh in the short term.
Real assets: Gold is the most asymmetric hedge against a complacent Fed, as demonstrated in the seventies. It can be complemented with positions in energy and commodities.
Equities: Concentration in quality at high multiples was paid for dearly in 1973–74 (Nifty Fifty bubble). However, in a context of uncertainty like today’s, with tech companies putting their balance sheets on the line, quality is proving to act as a haven. We are entering a period in which analysts have historically revised their earnings growth projections downward; according to the BofA manager survey, a certain complacency is perceived regarding the evolution of crude oil prices (42% of respondents expect the barrel to range between 70 and 80 dollars at year-end), which is evident in their levels of optimism; finally, retail margin purchases, in an area of excessive expansion (+37% year-on-year), reinforce the reading of short-term fragility.
The stock market rise since the rate hike meets the historical profile analyzed. The historical median is −3% at one and three months, with recovery from the fifth month. But the most similar cycle, that of March 2022, driven by supply inflation, was the only negative one at twelve months. With six observations, it is a directional reference.
Credit and dollar: In credit, short maturities with an emphasis on issuer quality. In the dollar, the rate differential supports it in the short term, but these regimes ended up depreciating it, as in 1971. That suggests flexible hedging ratios.
Three signals to watch that would bring us closer to the adverse scenario: a Fed pause or cut with core PCE above 3%, wages growing above 4%, and a lack of consensus within the Fed, with “dissenters” supporting cuts in the FOMC after November.
