BBVA Global Wealth Advisors (BBVA GWA), a registered investment advisor managing approximately $1.7 billion in client assets, recently announced the selection of SS&C Black Diamond Wealth Solutions as its primary platform to support its next phase of growth and further enhance the client experience, according to a press release.
Based in Miami, BBVA GWA serves a global client base, focusing on non-U.S. individuals investing in the United States. The firm offers investment management and advisory solutions in a dynamic and highly regulated financial market. The firm’s approach centers on a personalized investment process that guides clients through each stage of the investment cycle, from goal setting and strategy design to portfolio implementation and ongoing monitoring.
The choice of Black Diamond supports BBVA GWA’s ongoing expansion initiatives following the divestment of its parent company’s retail banking operations in the U.S. The firm plans to add approximately 10 advisors by the end of the year.
Black Diamond provides an integrated suite of capabilities, including portfolio performance reporting, a client portal, rebalancing and trading, CRM, and document management. BBVA GWA uses Black Diamond to unify workflows and deliver a more connected, high-touch client experience.
“Everything we do starts with understanding our clients—their goals, their ambitions, and the path they want to take,” said Humberto García, CEO of BBVA GWA. “As we continue to grow, we need technology that supports that level of personalization while allowing us to scale efficiently. Black Diamond provides us with the flexibility to offer a more tailored experience rather than a standardized one,” he concluded in the press release.
Steve Leivent, Senior Vice President and Co-General Manager of SS&C Wealth & Investment Technologies, noted: “Today’s clients expect a seamless experience that reflects both the sophistication of global markets and the personal nature of their financial goals.” He added, “Our integrated platform enables firms like BBVA GWA to quickly deliver more refined, tailored solutions that meet the unique needs of each client, all while maintaining high standards of transparency and service.”
Buying a luxury residence in Miami and receiving, alongside the apartment, a deeded private office that can be used, rented, or held as an independent asset is ceasing to be a real estate anomaly and becoming a new development formula.
This proposal alters the traditional logic of the luxury condominium. It is no longer merely about acquiring a home with a business center, a boardroom, or a coworking space as part of the amenities. In this new model, the buyer acquires two properties within a single transaction, and the office comes with its own title deed.
The distinction may seem subtle, but from an investor’s perspective, it is significant: an amenity is consumed; a real estate asset can retain value, be sold, or generate income.
The concept began gaining traction in Brickell, Miami’s primary financial district, precisely when prime office rents recorded extraordinary increases and corporate demand concentrated increasingly in well-located, premium buildings with high-level services.
The most representative case is One Twenty Brickell Residences, developed by Property Markets Group (PMG). The project features a 40-story tower with 467 fully finished and furnished residences, each paired with its own deeded office.
The offices feature private access, boardrooms, and concierge services. Above all, they are not part of a shared business center: they are independent real estate spaces linked to the buyer.
The new equation, therefore, is not simply “living and working in the same building.” It is living in one property while simultaneously owning another property capable of producing income.
The Price of Owning an Office in Brickell
The emergence of this product coincides with a transformation in Miami’s corporate market. According to CBRE data for the fourth quarter of 2025, Class A office rents in Brickell had increased approximately 74% since 2021, reaching around $102 per square foot annually.
The surge becomes even more pronounced when examining the most exclusive segment. In top-tier buildings, rents can reach $225 per square foot, compared to approximately $60 in 2021.
Cushman & Wakefield similarly identifies a sharp rise in occupier costs. Companies that renewed contracts at $40 or $50 per square foot before the pandemic may now face renewal proposals ranging between $120 and $130 per square foot.
As a result, occupancy costs for prime offices in Miami are beginning to rival even those of Manhattan. This comparison is relevant in understanding why an office included in a residential purchase can hold a far greater economic value than that of a simple amenity.
However, the market is not growing uniformly. CBRE reported a 14.9% vacancy rate across the entire Miami office market for the second quarter of 2026, with an average asking rent of $68.60 per square foot.
Even so, during that quarter, the city recorded a positive net absorption of 344,000 square feet, accompanied by rising asking rents.
Colliers, for its part, reported an office vacancy rate of 10.8% in Miami-Dade during the second quarter of 2026 and a record asking rent of $73.37 per square foot for Class A properties.
The conclusion that emerges from all the data is that there is not necessarily a generalized shortage of offices. What exists is a growing differentiation between lower-quality spaces and those with the location, services, and features required to attract high-net-worth tenants.
Savills identifies a similar trend, highlighting the role of technology firms, family offices, and financial institutions in driving demand for prime office space. It is precisely at this intersection of luxury housing, business activity, and a relative scarcity of high-quality corporate space where this new real estate product emerges.
From Amenity to Second Asset
For years, luxury condominium developers competed by incorporating private restaurants, gyms, spas, libraries, boardrooms, and coworking spaces. While all of these enhanced a property’s appeal, none could be sold separately.
By contrast, a deeded office changes the equation: the owner can use it for their own business, convert it into an extension of their residence, lease it to a third party, or—depending on condominium rules and applicable legislation—eventually sell it independently.
This turns what would traditionally have been an amenity into a real estate asset capable of generating cash flow. One Twenty Brickell implements the formula on a particularly significant scale: 467 residences and 467 deeded private offices.
In wealth management terms, a single residential transaction incorporates a second asset. For an investor, the question shifts from how much the apartment is worth to how much the office is worth and how much income it can generate.
The New Equation: Live, Work, and Rent
The concept is evolving beyond its original premise. At Twenty Sixth & 2nd in Wynwood, developed by PMG and LNDMRK Development, the project includes 233 residences and 122 deeded offices.
This development marks a new phase in expanding the model into one of the neighborhoods that has transformed most significantly in Miami over the past decade. The underlying logic differs markedly from the traditional home office: I live here, I work here, and I own an additional asset that I can monetize.
Under certain circumstances, an owner could occupy the apartment and lease the office. Alternatively, they could use the office for their business and lease the residence when not in use, provided building rules and local regulations permit.
The possibility of generating additional income is precisely one of the primary commercial selling points of the new model. Information provided by developers indicates that an office can represent an additional value of up to $80,000 annually, over and above any return generated by the apartment.
However, that figure should be interpreted as potential gross income rather than net yield. The true return will depend on the purchase price of the office, its size, location, demand, effective rent, vacancy periods, maintenance, property taxes, insurance, management, and other operational costs.
The relevant financial question, therefore, is not how much an office can be rented for, but how much actually remains in the owner’s hands after all expenses are accounted for.
That calculation will be decisive in establishing whether the deeded office represents a genuine real estate innovation or simply functions as a new sales hook for high-end condominiums.
The Model Expands
The formula no longer appears confined to Brickell.
Wynwood is among the first markets where it is being replicated, while Downtown Miami is also incorporating high-end projects with private offices into its real estate offerings.
This geographic expansion is important because it will show whether structural demand exists for this product or if its appeal depends primarily on the extraordinary conditions of Brickell’s financial district.
It also suggests a broader possibility: that integrating housing and office space may become a distinct category within the luxury market. The concept is particularly attractive in an environment where hybrid work has not eliminated the need for corporate spaces, but has reshaped their requirements.
Companies may require fewer square feet than before, but they are willing to pay more for representative, well-located spaces with quality services. In this context, a small, private, strategically located office can find a natural target market among entrepreneurs, independent professionals, family offices, and small firms that do not need large floor plates but require a prestigious address and corporate space.
The Latin American Component
The model also finds a natural market among international buyers, particularly Latin Americans.
Data regarding the new construction market indicates that Latin American buyers represent 86% of new construction purchasers in Miami—a proportion that helps explain why developers are designing products that address not only residential needs, but wealth planning and business requirements as well.
This metric aligns with figures from MIAMI REALTORS, which illustrate the significant role of international capital in South Florida’s real estate market. During 2025, foreign buyers purchased residential properties valued at approximately $4.4 billion in South Florida, up from $3.1 billion in 2024.
In terms of volume, foreign buyers acquired roughly 5,300 properties, compared to about 4,000 the previous year. International participation is particularly prominent in new housing. A study by MIAMI REALTORS covering 9,115 units across 37 developments found that international buyers accounted for 49% of sales in new construction, pre-sales, and condominium conversions over the 18 months ending in June 2025.
While measuring different subsets, both metrics point in the same direction: international buyers are a core component of Miami’s new construction real estate market. For a Latin American entrepreneur, the proposition of purchasing a residence and simultaneously obtaining a deeded office offers utility that extends well beyond convenience.
It can serve as a U.S. residence, a meeting space for clients, a headquarters for specific corporate activities, or an asset capable of generating a secondary income stream denominated in U.S. dollars. For an investor, adding an income-producing asset to a residential purchase introduces a new variable into return calculations.
From Residence to Wealth Platform
The true innovation of the model lies not necessarily in the office itself, but in converting a portion of a residential property into a wealth management platform with two distinct assets. For decades, the added value of luxury condominiums was tied to amenities, but a different question has emerged: Can an amenity become an asset?
For instance, a swimming pool cannot be rented independently, a gym cannot be sold, and a lounge does not have its own title deed. A deeded office, by contrast, possesses these characteristics, allowing it to acquire an economic value potentially independent of the residence.
This phenomenon aligns with a broader shift in the U.S. office market. Demand recovery has been uneven: high-quality properties located in core business corridors capable of offering a premium corporate experience are performing very differently from secondary spaces.
Cushman & Wakefield reported that office leasing activity in Miami totaled approximately 830,500 square feet during the first half of 2026, though volume was 28.5% lower than that recorded during the same period the previous year.
However, second-quarter activity increased 44.4% compared to the prior quarter. This suggests that while the market continues to adjust, indicators demonstrate that demand for quality space remains a significant part of the equation.
Risks exist, however. One challenge is that innovation may eventually become the industry standard. Furthermore, the model’s appeal does not eliminate underlying risks, the first of which is liquidity.
A small, specialized office may have a much narrower secondary market than a residential unit. Its value will depend on location, dimensions, layout, condominium regulations, permitted uses, and the depth of commercial demand.
Another risk is the cost of ownership. Florida has tightened financial and maintenance requirements for condominiums following the Surfside collapse. An academic study published this year found that higher future costs related to new regulatory demands are already reflected in the state’s condominium prices.
A third risk is future competition. If more developers begin including deeded offices in their developments, the concept may lose part of its differentiation, as real estate innovations command a premium while scarce, but see that premium compress once they become a standard feature.
Consequently, the real value of a deeded office will not be determined solely by holding an independent title deed, but will depend on sustained demand for those specific spaces.
A New Category for Investors
For now, deeded offices represent a niche within Miami’s luxury condominium market. However, the concept is noteworthy because it bridges three markets that were traditionally analyzed separately: high-end residential, corporate offices, and real estate investment.
In this context, Brickell functioned as a testing ground, while Wynwood and Downtown Miami demonstrate the potential to replicate the model. Meanwhile, the substantial presence of international buyers provides a natural market for a product that offers more than a residence.
This evolution could lead to the establishment of a distinct real estate category: properties designed not only for living, but for working and generating income. For developers, the advantage lies in differentiating projects and increasing the perceived value of each transaction.
For buyers, the equation is more nuanced. An office can serve as an additional dollar-denominated income stream, but only if rental income exceeds carrying costs and sufficient occupier demand exists. For private wealth investors, particularly those using Miami as a platform to diversify international capital, the fundamental question remains: Are they purchasing a luxury amenity, or acquiring a second, cash-flow-generating real estate asset?
The answer will determine whether deeded offices are simply the latest differentiation strategy for luxury condominium developers or the beginning of a new approach to structuring real estate assets in Miami.
The world changes at terrifying speeds, and financial markets do too; today there is a reason why every quarter investors await the financial results of Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Tesla as if they were a leading indicator for the financial markets. No, it is not merely because they are seven of the most valuable companies in the world, but because a growing portion of global portfolios is exposed to them, directly or indirectly. Today, the Magnificent 7 are a genuine dilemma for asset managers, but there are dilemmas and then there are dilemmas; this one might not be entirely negative, but it has its own distinct peculiarities.
Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Tesla—the Magnificent 7—do not only concentrate an extraordinary portion of U.S. market capitalization; the real impact is that because their results, artificial intelligence investments, and growth expectations determine the behavior of indices, ETFs, and investment funds.
Therefore, for managers, the challenge is no longer deciding whether to have exposure to the Magnificent Seven, but how much to hold, how to diversify it, and what to do if market leadership begins to broaden. An investor may have never purchased a single share of Nvidia, yet that does not mean they do not hold it within an S&P 500 ETF, a U.S. growth fund, a global equity strategy, a pension plan, or a portfolio managed by a wealth manager.
This is the true financial dimension of the phenomenon. The so-called Magnificent 7 have become one of the primary transmission mechanisms between the artificial intelligence economy and investment markets. In this sense, their most recent financial results—now that we are in earnings season—show that the story is entering a new phase: it is no longer just about how fast their revenues are growing, but how much money they are forced to invest to sustain that growth and who will ultimately capture the benefits of the AI revolution.
Too Big to Be Ignored
According to Vanguard data, the seven companies combined generated approximately $2.2 trillion in revenue during 2025—a scale that helps explain why they ceased being a mere group of tech companies to become a macroeconomic and market factor. Concentration has also altered the nature of diversification; a fund tracking a market-cap-weighted index may hold hundreds of stocks, yet a significant proportion of its risk and return can end up depending on a relatively small group of companies.
This phenomenon concerns even major asset management firms. BlackRock, for instance, acknowledges that the U.S. market is at historically elevated levels of concentration and posits that the challenge for investors is finding exposure to AI growth without remaining excessively concentrated in today’s mega winners.
T. Rowe Price, for its part, has directly addressed the concentration problem created by the Magnificent Seven and its implications for portfolio construction. That is, the question is no longer whether the Magnificent Seven are good companies, but how much additional risk holding all of them introduces. Nevertheless, all seven are companies that cannot go unnoticed under any circumstances; together or apart, they are simply too big to ignore. Below is a brief summary of why that is the case.
Nvidia: The Company That Turned AI into Financial Results
If one company had to be chosen to represent the transformation of the stock market phenomenon into a financial reality, it would be Nvidia. On August 26, the company reported results for its fiscal 2027 second quarter. The numbers are extraordinary: revenues of $96.2 billion, up 106% year-over-year; Data Center revenues of $89.0 billion, up 117% year-over-year; GAAP net income of $59.7 billion, up 126% year-over-year; and a gross margin of 75%. The company expects revenues of approximately $108.0 billion for its fiscal third quarter.
For asset managers, however, there is an even more important figure: Nvidia is not merely selling chips; it is becoming the primary financial beneficiary of the massive capital expenditure cycle in artificial intelligence infrastructure. The company noted that AI infrastructure buildouts continue to accelerate and anticipated revenue growth of approximately 70% for fiscal year 2028, though it pointed out that its outlook remains supply-constrained. That shifts the conversation within investment funds: Nvidia is no longer just a technology play, but a bet on the capital expenditure of the entire technology industry.
Microsoft: The Other Side of the Boom
Microsoft represents the second major component of the equation: enterprise monetization of AI. In its fiscal year 2026, the company recorded the following figures: $331.8 billion in revenue, up 18% year-over-year; $155.2 billion in operating income, up 21%; and $133.7 billion in net income, a 31% increase. Azure and other cloud services grew 43% during the fourth quarter, according to company data. Meanwhile, Microsoft Cloud reached $214.4 billion in revenue for the fiscal year.
A figure of particular importance to an asset manager is that Microsoft closed the fiscal year with $678.0 billion in commercial remaining performance obligations—a signal of the tremendous visibility it holds over future revenues. But another factor is at play: the company is deploying massive amounts of capital into AI infrastructure, and its margins are beginning to feel the shift in business mix. For investors, a fundamental question emerges: How much of current AI capital expenditure will translate into profitable growth, and how much will weigh on cash flow?
Amazon and Alphabet: When AI Begins to Consume Cash
That same question emerges even more clearly at Alphabet and Amazon. Alphabet raised its 2026 capital expenditure guidance to a range between $195.0 billion and $205.0 billion, up from a previous guidance range of $180.0 billion to $190.0 billion. The company explained that the increase stems from the need to accelerate capacity to meet demand, but it also cautioned that technical infrastructure investments will drive up depreciation and data center operating costs while keeping cash flow under pressure.
This has a direct consequence for asset managers. Until now, the narrative could be summarized as: more AI investment = more growth. Now it is shifting toward: more AI investment = more growth, but also higher capital intensity and cash flow pressure. Amazon exhibits the same phenomenon. In the second quarter of 2026, its sales grew 20% to $200.6 billion, while AWS surged 37% to $42.2 billion. Operating income increased 43% to $27.5 billion.
However, its trailing 12-month free cash flow turned negative to -$7.6 billion, primarily driven by a $66.1 billion increase in purchases of property and equipment, fueled mainly by artificial intelligence investments. For a fund manager, this is a crucial distinction: revenue growth can remain extraordinary while free cash flow temporarily deteriorates due to capex. The question is when that spending will begin generating sufficient returns.
Meta Shows the Cost of the Race
Meta provides another example. In the second quarter, its revenues grew 28% to $60.8 billion, but its costs and expenses rose 55%. The result was a 14% decline in net income to $15.8 billion. The company spent $31.1 billion on capex during the quarter, while generating just $784 million in free cash flow.
For fund managers, this introduces a new variable: the market can no longer evaluate the Magnificent Seven solely through valuation multiples; additional factors must be scrutinized, including capex, depreciation, free cash flow, return on invested capital (ROIC), top-line growth, operating margins, energy consumption, data center demand, and, increasingly, the capacity to monetize AI models.
Apple and Tesla Break Group Uniformity
Signs indicate that the Magnificent Seven no longer behave as a homogeneous block. Apple reported record third-quarter fiscal 2026 revenues of $109.4 billion, up 16% year-over-year, driven by double-digit growth across iPhone, Mac, and Services. Tesla, by contrast, presented a far more complex picture. In the second quarter, it generated $28.2 billion in revenue, up 26% year-over-year, but its operating income fell 57% to $398 million, with its operating margin narrowing to 1.4%. Its capex surged 142% to $5.8 billion, resulting in a negative free cash flow of -$1.1 billion.
This highlights something important: the seven companies are no longer a single trade. Apple represents ecosystems, devices, and services; Microsoft and Amazon represent cloud and enterprise software; Alphabet represents search, advertising, and cloud; Meta represents advertising and social platforms; Nvidia represents AI hardware infrastructure; and Tesla represents electric vehicles, energy storage, autonomy, and robotics. That is why Vanguard cautions that the “Magnificent Seven” label can obscure critical differences among their underlying business models.
The Dilemma for Funds: To Hold or Not to Hold
The influx of figures and business models creates a genuine dilemma for asset managers. An active manager who drastically reduces exposure to the Magnificent Seven risks lagging their benchmark if Nvidia, Microsoft, or the others lead market rallies once again. Conversely, a manager maintaining elevated exposure risks significant relative underperformance if market breadth expands toward small-cap equities, traditional sectors, or international markets. Concentration has become a core risk management issue, not merely a stock selection decision.
BlackRock points out that while the U.S. market is at historical concentration levels, earnings growth prospects are beginning to broaden beyond the Magnificent Seven. The firm notes that the rest of the S&P 500 could narrow the EPS growth gap relative to the mega caps during 2026. As a result, market participants are asking whether it is time for asset managers to seek out the “Magnificent 8, 9, 10…”, as capital may begin migrating from the initial winners to their direct suppliers—a broadening of the investment universe that BlackRock is already highlighting.
In its outlook for the third quarter of 2026, the asset management firm notes that investors are seeking opportunities in the infrastructure, energy, and industrial layers supporting the expansion of AI beyond first-order beneficiaries, which could mark a major transformation for active management. If the first phase of the boom was about buying the mega-cap tech winners, the second phase may focus on identifying the supplier ecosystem capturing the next dollar of capital expenditure—a transition that is already reshaping portfolio construction.
The impact reaches directly into ETFs and index funds. A market-cap-weighted S&P 500 ETF automatically increases its exposure to companies as their market valuations rise. That means an extraordinary rally in Nvidia does not merely benefit direct shareholders; it also increases its weight within numerous index products. Thus, concentration can turn into a self-reinforcing loop: the stock rises → its market capitalization grows → its index weight increases → funds tracking the index must buy more exposure → capital continues to concentrate. This does not necessarily mean an automatic mechanism continues to push the stock higher, but rather that market capitalization dictates how passive capital is allocated. This phenomenon has reached the point where Nvidia accounts for roughly 8% of the S&P 500, according to data recently cited by MarketWatch.
For asset managers, this makes true diversification a far more complex concept. A fund may hold 500 constituents and still remain heavily exposed to the same underlying narratives: AI, cloud computing, semiconductors, digital advertising, and U.S. mega-cap equities.
The Big Question for 2027: What Is AI Really Worth?
Today, the issue is not that the Magnificent Seven are producing weak operational results; on the contrary, their figures remain extraordinary: Nvidia has doubled its revenues, Microsoft grows at a double-digit pace, Amazon is accelerating AWS, Alphabet is ramping up infrastructure investments, Meta is driving strong top-line growth, Apple posts record quarterly revenues, and Tesla is committing growing amounts of capital to AI, autonomous driving, and robotics. However, expectations are now so elevated that the market demands these investments produce increasingly higher returns.
BlackRock summarized this in its 2026 outlook, warning that AI-related capital expenditure has reached a scale large enough to carry macroeconomic implications, while the revenues derived from those investments will arrive with a lag. For fund managers and wealth administrators, the Magnificent Seven represent both an opportunity and a concentration risk.
The opportunity lies in participating in one of the largest technology investment cycles in history; the risk is that much of the market is already fully positioned in it. The next phase of asset management may not center on whether the Magnificent Seven will continue to win, but on discovering which companies will profit as the capital currently flowing into the Magnificent Seven spreads across the rest of the economy.
Photo courtesyAlberto D’Avenia, Head of Americas Distribution at BNP Paribas Asset Management
After more than a decade working across various firms between Italy and Miami, executive Alberto D’Avenia has returned to BNP Paribas Asset Management. The professional announced his appointment via LinkedIn after assuming the role of Head of Americas Distribution at the asset manager.
In his new capacity as Head of Americas Distribution, he will be responsible for the entire Americas region, covering the full scope of LATAM, U.S. Institutional, and U.S. Offshore. However, according to sources familiar with the matter, D’Avenia oversees BNP Paribas AM’s liquid asset strategies. For alternative assets, the executive in charge is Álvaro Correas, who serves as Head of Business Development and Investor Relations for Iberia and Latin America at CAPZA—the firm serving as BNP’s private equity and private debt arm.
The asset manager’s regional distribution team, which D’Avenia now joins, includes John Barletta and Rafael Tovar. John Barletta currently serves as Head of Wholesale Distribution for BNPP AM, while Rafael Tovar serves as Head of U.S. Offshore and Wholesale Distribution for Latin America at the former AXA Investment Managers, which is now fully integrated into BNPP AM.
It is worth noting that AXA IM was incorporated into BNP Paribas AM in July of last year. Within the group’s structure, the firm operates under the Investment & Protection Services division, which specializes in investments, savings, protection, and real estate services. BNP Paribas Asset Management maintains a local presence with offices in Brazil and Mexico, and has a Head of LatAm (excluding Brazil) supporting product sales across the region: Pedro Pablo Montero, who is based in Chile. In Brazil, operations are led by Aquiles Mosca, CEO of Brazil and Head of Sales for the country, who will now report to Alberto D’Avenia.
In addition to AXA’s agreement with AMCS—a Miami-based group dedicated to distributing third-party strategies across Latin American and U.S. Offshore markets—BNP Paribas Asset Management maintains a local footprint with offices in Brazil and Mexico.
Extensive Industry Experience
Prior to returning to the group, D’Avenia served for three and a half years as Head of U.S. Offshore at Voya Investment Management. Before that, he spent a decade at Allianz Global Investors, where he rose to the position of Head of U.S. Non-Resident Business and LatAm Retail.
A major stretch of the professional’s career—spanning 13 years across various positions—was spent precisely at BNP Paribas AM. He first joined as a Senior Client Relationship Manager in 2000 and advanced within the firm to become Head of External Distribution Sales for Italy and the Mediterranean region between 2011 and 2013. Additionally, he has held positions at Epta Fund SGR, Deutsche Bank Italia, Azimut, and Prime Consult SIM
Robeco presented its first two active ETFs—the Robeco 3D Global Equity UCITS ETF and the Robeco 3D Emerging Markets UCITS ETF—in Miami during a luncheon that gathered over 60 professionals from wirehouses, private banks, and broker-dealers across the offshore industry. The presentation was led by María Elena Isaza and Julieta Henke from LarrainVial, Robeco’s distributor in the US Offshore market, alongside Alejandra Saldías, Head of ETF Sales. It also featured participation from Ignacio Alcántara, Ana Curiel, and Jan Sytze Mosselar from the Dutch asset manager’s New York office.
The event took place against a backdrop of strong momentum for active vehicles within the ETF industry, a segment that has gained ground over traditional passive products in recent years. In this space, asset managers with a track record in quantitative management—such as Robeco—are seeking to position themselves by translating their analytical capabilities into a format increasingly demanded by offshore investors.
Executives During the Miami Luncheon
The Quantitative Strategy
During the meeting, Sytze Mosselaar, portfolio manager, explained the investment process of Robeco’s quantitative team and highlighted the opportunities generated by artificial intelligence’s growing weight in Asian markets. The new vehicles translate a strategy with a 20-year track record into an ETF format, managing three dimensions—risk, return, and sustainability—under an “Enhanced” approach that aims to boost index exposure while maintaining limited deviations.
This development adds to an active ETF platform that, in less than 18 months, has already reached €2 billion (around $2.32 billion) in assets under management—a growth rate that the asset manager itself highlights as a key indicator of the interest these products are generating among investors. With the launch of these two new funds, the products become specifically available to offshore segment investors, expanding the geographic reach of the strategy.
“One of Robeco’s Core Strengths”
When asked about what excites her most regarding the new products, Isaza focused on the manager’s quantitative expertise: “Robeco’s quantitative management is one of its core strengths and something that until now we had not been able to offer with this breadth on US Offshore market platforms. ETFs allow us to incorporate this expertise in a much more accessible way for our clients.” As she explained, the new format complements the existing familiarity financial advisors have with the firm: “This nicely complements the strategies advisors already know from Robeco, particularly in fundamental equity and credit. With Active ETFs, we expand that offering by now also incorporating quantitative expertise.”
The LarrainVial executive also framed the launch within the broader growth occurring across the global ETF industry—a phenomenon, she noted, that no asset manager can afford to ignore: “The ETF industry continues to grow significantly globally, and for us, participating in that evolution was essential. Now we can do so through Active ETFs as well, combining the advantages of the ETF structure with the quantitative management in which Robeco has a long track record.” For Isaza, the new product is also a tool to deepen commercial ties with network clients offshore: “This allows us to deepen relationships with our clients and position Robeco as a key partner, offering an increasingly broad set of solutions and capabilities to meet diverse portfolio needs.”
Isaza concluded her remarks with an assessment of the asset manager’s performance in building this platform, highlighting the speed with which Robeco established its market presence: “We are very excited about the growth Robeco has achieved. In just two years, it has secured significant asset inflows. The addition of Active ETFs marks a new chapter and significantly expands the opportunities we can develop with our clients.”
LarrainVial’s Role as Distributor
The partnership between the two firms began 20 years ago and today covers Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, with LarrainVial serving as the sales force in US offshore territories. Robeco reorganized its Americas operations in 2023 under the entity Robeco Americas, based in New York, and expanded its agreement with LarrainVial to include the wholesale business in US Offshore and Latam, based in Miami.
LarrainVial continued distributing Robeco funds to Latin American institutional clients as it had for the previous two decades. As part of that same transition, María Elena Isaza and Julieta Henke—previously directors and sales managers for Robeco’s US Offshore and Latam business—joined LarrainVial as managing directors while remaining based in Miami. Meanwhile, the integration of Robeco’s activities across the Americas was placed under the leadership of Ignacio Alcántara to drive service efficiency in a regulated and competitive market.
The stock market history of the world is full of episodes that turned autumn into a synonym for risk: 1929, 1987, 1997, 2001, and 2008 are a few examples of years that left behind some of the most violent trading days and periods in these markets.
September is, statistically, the worst month for U.S. equities, while October concentrates several of the largest crashes in history. The above is relevant because in 2026, the calendar once again finds a highly valued market, concentrated in technology and facing fresh pressures on interest rates, inflation, and geopolitics. Although nothing is written and no one can predict the future, it is always important to remember the lessons of history.
It is a fact: Wall Street is about to enter one of the times of the year that instills the most respect among investors; anything can happen.
Not because September or October have, in themselves, the power to cause a crisis. Financial history does not work according to calendars. But a hard-to-ignore coincidence exists: some of the largest episodes of stock market wealth destruction in the modern era occurred during these two months.
The most famous precedent is October 1929. But then came October 1987, October 1997, September 2001, and the dramatic September–October period of 2008. They are different episodes, caused by different problems, but all left the same lesson for asset managers: when a market reaches a zone of high confidence, leverage, concentration, or valuation, any catalyst can turn a correction into a crisis.
September is not superstition, it is the worst month on the calendar; October is the month of frights
The data partially supports the month’s bad reputation. The S&P 500 has historically recorded a negative average return close to -1% in September, making it the month with the worst average performance of the year. Data from S&P Dow Jones Indices show that, since 1928, September records an average return of approximately -1.03% and finishes with gains only about 44.7% of the time.
More recent data point in the same direction. For the long period analyzed by Dow Jones Market Data, both the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average lose an average of around 1.1% in September, while the Nasdaq Composite records an average drop close to 0.8%.
The statistics do not mean that September will be negative every year. In fact, the market can rise strongly during the month. What they mean is that, statistically, the distribution of outcomes is less favorable than in other months. And here appears the first important difference between September and October.
October has a worse reputation, but September is usually worse in terms of average return. October is, above all, the month of big frights. Cboe has noted that October has historically displayed the highest levels of monthly volatility for the S&P 500, although a large part of that characteristic is influenced by extraordinary episodes such as 1987 and 2008.
In other words: September tends to penalize performance more; October has a stronger historical association with extreme moves.
1929: The autumn that forever changed financial history
The first major chapter began even before October. During the 1920s, speculation drove the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 63 points in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929—an increase of approximately six times in eight years. The market reached levels that seemed to justify the idea that it had entered a new era of permanent prosperity.
But the reality was very different; after the September peak, signs of deterioration began. On October 28, 1929, the so-called Black Monday, the Dow lost nearly 13%. A day later, Black Tuesday, it plunged another 12%. By mid-November, the Dow had lost virtually half its value from its peak.
However, the real impact was much greater than the stock market crash; the collapse damaged bank and corporate balance sheets, caused credit contraction, and ended up becoming part of the process that led to the historic Great Depression, the worst U.S. economic contraction of the 20th century, which lasted from 1929 to 1941.
A historical clarification is important: 1929 did not cause the Great Depression on its own. The crash was the financial trigger of a much broader process involving monetary contraction, banking failures, deflation, falling international trade, and other factors.
1987: When the Dow lost 22.6% in a single day
Nearly six decades later, October again became synonymous with panic. It was October 19, 1987—Black Monday—when the Dow Jones plunged 508.32 points, equivalent to 22.61%, the largest single-day percentage drop in its history.
The figure remains impressive: the drop far surpassed the record of 12.8% set on October 28, 1929. The destruction of wealth was devastating; over $500 billion in market capitalization vanished from the New York Stock Exchange that day, while 604.33 million shares were traded, approximately three times the daily average at the time.
Yet 1987 left another fundamental lesson: a market can suffer an extraordinary crash without necessarily triggering an economic depression. The Federal Reserve reacted by providing liquidity to the financial system, and markets subsequently began to stabilize.
It also gave birth to one of the tools that forms part of today’s market infrastructure: circuit breakers, mechanisms designed to temporarily halt trading when declines reach specific thresholds.
1997: The Asian crisis reaches Wall Street
Ten years later, October proved once more that a crisis can travel quickly across regions due to a new era: the era of globalization. On October 27, 1997, amid the Asian financial crisis, the Dow lost 554.26 points, equivalent to 7.2%, after a plunge in Asian stock markets heightened fears regarding global growth and U.S. corporate earnings.
The episode was particularly relevant to the evolution of financial infrastructure; for the first time since their creation, circuit breakers were triggered on Wall Street. The market had to halt trading temporarily and close earlier than usual. The day proved that financial globalization had altered a core market feature: a localized shock could be transmitted to other continents in a matter of hours.
2001: September and the return of fear
The next major historical episode occurred precisely in September; after the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. markets remained closed for four trading sessions. When Wall Street reopened on September 17, 2001, the Dow Jones lost approximately 7%, while the S&P 500 fell around 5% and the Nasdaq close to 6.8%. The Dow lost nearly 679 points during the session, its largest single-day point drop at that time.
It was not merely an emotional reaction. The market was already weakened by the bursting of the tech bubble and a deteriorating U.S. economy; September simply concentrated the shock.
2008: When September stopped being a month and became a crisis
The most relevant episode for today’s investors may be 2008; on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. The Federal Reserve has described that moment as a turning point that triggered a massive retreat of investors from risky assets and a loss of liquidity in short-term funding markets.
But the crisis did not end with Lehman; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been placed under government conservatorship, AIG faced a liquidity crisis, and the money market fund industry experienced heavy withdrawals after a fund broke the $1.00 net asset value barrier.
During September and October, massive sell-offs spread across virtually the entire financial system; October 2008 ended with a monthly decline for the S&P 500 of nearly 16.9%, ranking among the worst months in the index’s history. The market was no longer reacting simply to bad corporate news; it was pricing in the possibility of a systemic credit crisis.
That is perhaps the main difference between a stock market crash and a financial crisis: the former destroys market value; the latter can simultaneously paralyze credit, the banking system, and the real economy.
The pattern exists, but it is not a prophecy
For portfolio managers, the most important conclusion is probably also the least spectacular: September and October carry no financial curse.
In fact, October finishes with positive returns more often than its reputation suggests. Between 1950 and 2024, the S&P 500 ended October with gains approximately 59% of the time, with an average return close to 0.85%. The issue lies in the magnitude of the extreme episodes.
October includes three of the worst months in S&P 500 history: October 1987 (-21.8%), October 1929 (-19.9%), and October 2008 (-16.9%). That is to say, October does not necessarily drop more than other months; it simply possesses an extraordinary capacity to feature in history books when things go wrong.
Therefore, using the calendar as an automatic sell signal would be a mistake. But using it as a reminder to review risks can be a rational decision, especially when entering autumn with its own set of vulnerabilities—which is when historical comparisons acquire relevance.
Wall Street closed August with gains: the Dow gained around 2.1% during the month, the S&P 500 3%, and the Nasdaq 4.1%, according to recent data. But behind that strength lies a market that is particularly sensitive to expectations surrounding artificial intelligence, interest rates, and growth; at the same time, the macroeconomic landscape has grown complicated.
On another note, no less relevant, military tensions between the United States and Iran pushed oil prices above $90 per barrel at times, while global bond yields rose and the market began pricing in a higher probability of a rate hike by the Federal Reserve in September.
The FOMC meeting is scheduled for September 15 and 16, meaning the market will enter the month with one of its main catalysts occurring right within the historically weakest period for equities—a combination that is especially relevant for asset managers.
A market concentrated in a handful of technology companies can appear solid as long as investors continue paying elevated multiples for future growth. However, if expectations regarding interest rates, inflation, growth, or the return on artificial intelligence investments shift simultaneously, the same concentration that propels the market during rally phases can amplify losses during a correction.
Added to this is the growth of leveraged strategies and derivative products. In 2026, for example, the number of single-stock ETFs with leveraged or inverse positions has multiplied extraordinarily, accelerating the speed at which specific moves can transmit across equities and derivative products.
The real lesson for funds and wealth management
For fund managers, family offices, and wealth managers, the lesson of September and October is not to exit the market, but to ask what would happen to a portfolio if the scenario changes rapidly.
Historical lessons serve precisely that purpose: 1929 taught the danger of leverage and speculative bubbles; 1987 showed that automated trading mechanisms can amplify extreme moves and that market liquidity can vanish much faster than anticipated; 1997 confirmed that financial shocks travel globally; 2001 showed how a geopolitical shock can hit an already weakened market; and 2008 left perhaps the most important lesson for institutional investors: the real risk lies not just in falling stock prices, but in the simultaneous disappearance of liquidity across multiple markets.
That is why, as September 2026 begins, history is not saying that Wall Street will necessarily fall, but it is saying something far more useful for a professional investor: when valuations are elevated, positions are concentrated, and the cost of money becomes a market variable once again, it pays to enter autumn asking not how much higher a portfolio can go, but how much it could lose if history decides to repeat itself.
Because September does not cause crashes, but history proves that when a market enters autumn feeling vulnerable, September and October have proven capable of turning a crack into a fracture.
Markets were hit this Monday by a fresh escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iran, featuring U.S. strikes against IRGC targets on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian retaliatory measures against the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. Markets also had to digest the hawkish speech delivered by Fed Chair Kevin Warsh at Jackson Hole, where he reaffirmed the 2% inflation target and noted that “there is work left to do.” As an immediate result, the probability of a Fed rate hike in September quickly jumped from 36% to 67%.
U.S. Bonds: Normalization, Not Fiscal Alarm
The U.S. Treasury yield touched annual highs, approaching 4.8%, while Japanese sovereign debt (with JGBs near 3%) and German debt (Bunds at 3.3%) were also affected.
News regarding U.S. debt reaching $40 trillion helped amplify the noise, though the numbers point in the opposite direction: the historical correlation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and real rates (TIPS) is negative, because until 2017 the government only increased spending substantially during recessions. The fiscal outlook projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis is not optimistic, but for now, nominal economic growth (according to the New York Fed’s model) far exceeds the 10-year bond yield—suggesting that borrowing costs are not onerous for investment—and, surprisingly, Trump has not fulfilled forecasts, as the budget deficit has remained fairly stable since 2024 despite everything.
For all these reasons, although the uncertainty introduced into the macro picture by the closure of Hormuz, the war in Ukraine, Trump’s fiscal policy, or the Fed’s abandonment of forward guidance has impacted bonds, the rise in yields has less to do with the fiscal picture than with the normalization of growth, inflation, and rate trends.
We are coming off a very peculiar 2010–2020 decade, marked by disinflationary dynamics, household and corporate balance sheet deleveraging, and below-potential growth that led major central banks to adopt zero interest rate policies.
Over the past two years, we have witnessed a macro normalization, with inflation rates slightly above the comfort zone and more robust GDP growth. As a result, 10-year real interest rates in the United States have returned to the range where they fluctuated in the mid-2000s, still well below the levels reached in the 1990s, and the term premium has also regularized.
Despite the noise, bond yields have followed the historical pattern of behavior maintained over the last 30 years relative to interest rate expectations (approximated via SOFR futures). This serves to prove that the yield spike has more to do with a new economic reality than with a higher perceived threat of default associated with U.S. debt.
Similarly, if we model the U.S. bond yield using the latest update of the Fed’s economic projections report, we can conclude that the asset is trading at a certain discount, attributable to the uncertainty affecting energy prices.
However, households and businesses are less sensitive to rate hikes than in the previous decade. Their balance sheets have been repaired since then: household debt as a percentage of GDP hovered around 100% between 2008 and 2009 and today stands at 64.85%, levels not seen since 1997. Furthermore, their leverage ratio relative to net worth is at 60-year lows. In the corporate sector, according to the NFIB survey, management teams show no significant concern over interest payments on their debt.
On the Fed, Inflation, and the Labor Market
Additionally, labor market activity and inflation may ease Warsh’s task in the coming months. Bloomberg’s inflation and job creation surprise indices point to a moderation in the Fed’s hawkish stance, a conclusion similar to that drawn from the Truflation index, which incorporates the prices of millions of daily transactions. The August price index data, set to be published on September 11, will have major implications.
An advance indicator came on Thursday with comments from Christopher Waller, who validated signs of easing inflationary pressures while remaining watchful for evidence confirming a trend toward the 2% target. Following his intervention, futures shifted to price in only a 52% probability of a September rate hike. If the monthly core figure comes in at +0.2% as estimated by consensus economists, the Fed will likely maintain a hawkish tone without altering benchmark rates.
In the labor market, we continue operating in a “few layoffs, few hires” environment, although we may be losing some momentum in recent months. The private ADP job creation indicator has maintained a downward trajectory since March, while the Kansas City Fed labor market conditions indicator has yet to find a floor.
Equities: Resilience and Valuation
All told, investors may be overestimating the impact that a 5% yield could have on stock market performance.
The deleveraging process carried out between 2010 and 2020 substantially improved the balance sheets of households, businesses, and banks, making them more resilient to rate increases. Despite tighter credit, demand remains steady or is even improving.
The S&P 500 P/E ratio has compressed from 23x to 19x, and historical evidence shows that the relationship between moves in 10-year bond yields and valuations is inconclusive.
To the extent that the adjustment toward a normalized rate environment remains gradual, earnings-per-share growth will drive valuations over the coming months.
CC-BY-SA-2.0, FlickrAndrea Rossi, Chief Executive Officer of M&G plc, parent company of M&G Investments
In a market characterized by macroeconomic complexity, M&G plc has demonstrated the strength and resilience of its business model by recording its best half-year performance in seven years, consolidating a deep and successful transformation toward a low-capital-intensity operating profile. In this regard, Andrea Rossi, Chief Executive Officer of the Group, noted: “The business is delivering a solid performance, with an adjusted operating profit of £435 million [€504.6 million], up 15% year-on-year, representing our best first-half result since our IPO in 2019. We continue to execute our strategy, successfully orienting the Group toward high-quality, low-capital-intensity (capital-light) earnings, which now account for 80% of total adjusted operating profit.”
This robust performance is underpinned by operational milestones during the first half of 2026 that evidence the success of the corporate strategy. Despite environment volatility, the firm attracted net inflows into its open business worth £2.4 billion [€2.784 billion], an achievement primarily supported by M&G Investments, the Asset Management division, which drew net subscriptions from external clients worth £2.2 billion [€2.552 billion]. The firm reports that numbers were positive across both retail and institutional channels, backed by its expansion in the United Kingdom and internationally.
At the same time, M&G reinforced the diversification of this division by raising external client assets under management and administration to £189 billion [€219.24 billion]—equivalent to 53% of total assets under management for the segment—of which £110 billion [€127.6 billion] comes from international investors. This commercial dynamism also translated into a contribution of £13 million [€15.08 million] in new annualized net revenues within Asset Management, where investor interest in high-value solutions—especially in private markets, which recorded net inflows of £1.3 billion [€1.508 billion] and reached £83 billion [€96.32 billion] in assets—continues to serve as a strategic pillar of growth.
To contextualize these solid capital flows, Rossi added that “net inflows of £2.4 billion [€2.784 billion] in open business reflect the breadth and strength of our offering. Asset Management contributed £2.2 billion [€2.552 billion] in net inflows from external clients, of which £700 million [€812 million] was channeled through our strategic alliance with Dai-ichi Life Group.” This commercial success not only consolidates current figures, but accelerates the firm’s structural shift. Along these lines, the executive further elaborated on the group’s evolution, stating: “M&G continues to grow and transform, becoming a more diversified, efficient, and less capital-intensive business. With a clear strategy, disciplined execution, and the right resources, I am confident in our prospects for the second half of 2026 and our ability to deliver sustainable long-term value to our clients, partners, and shareholders.”
Maintaining the established plan
Looking ahead, the firm stated that it considers itself to be in a privileged position to sustain this financial momentum, relying on its competitive advantages in structurally growing markets. The company’s roadmap is firmly focused on preserving its financial strength, simplifying the organization, and driving profitable growth. In terms of profitability, the entity reiterates its commitment to achieving average annual pre-tax adjusted operating profit (AOP) growth of at least 5% for the 2025–2027 triennium.
Thanks to the business’s strong performance so far this year, management expects to close the 2026 financial year with a low double-digit increase in AOP on a full-year basis.
In parallel, the group is making progress toward its operational efficiency target after recording a cost-to-income ratio of 73% in the first half, with the expectation of continuing to improve it in the second half of the year to approach its 70% target. Likewise, the entity confirms that it is moving at an optimal pace to meet its cumulative operational capital generation target of £2.7 billion [€3.132 billion] for the 2025–2027 period.
Photo courtesyJavier García de Vinuesa, Country Head for Iberia at Natixis Investment Managers.
Fidelity International, a global asset management and retirement savings firm, has appointed Javier García de Vinuesa as Head of Iberia and Latin America, as the firm continues to strengthen its business in the region.
Javier will join Fidelity on September 14 to lead the firm’s operations across Iberia and Latin America. Based in Madrid, he will drive growth and deepen client relationships in the region, reporting directly to Cosmo Schinaia, Head of Southern Europe and Latin America.
Javier brings over 25 years of experience in asset management and distribution. He joins from Natixis Investment Managers, where he served as Country Head for Iberia, overseeing institutional, wholesale, private banking, and strategic alliance channels.
Prior to Natixis, Javier spent 20 years at Robeco in various senior regional and global leadership roles, including Global Head of Wholesale Distribution and Global Financial Institutions. His scope spanned Europe, the Americas, and Asia, including several years based in Miami as Head of Latin America and US Offshore. Earlier in his career, he held senior positions at Société Générale-Lyxor, Merrill Lynch, and Banco Santander.
Cosmo Schinaia, Head of Southern Europe at Fidelity International, stated: “We are delighted to welcome Javier to Fidelity. Iberia and Latin America are important markets for Fidelity International,” adding that “Javier brings extensive experience in the region and a deep understanding of evolving client needs. His expertise will be invaluable as we continue to strengthen our offering and bring more of Fidelity’s capabilities to our clients.”
Invesco, one of the world’s leading independent investment managers, has appointed Saúl Santamaría to reinforce its commercial team and expand coverage for its ETF business in Latin America and the US Offshore market.
With this appointment, Invesco reinforces its commitment to these markets and its strategy to remain ever closer to its clients and distribution partners in the region. In his new role, Santamaría will work closely with institutional clients, distributors, and intermediary networks, contributing to the development of strategic relationships and the expansion of Invesco’s ETF platform.
This strategic move comes amid growing interest in ETFs as efficient, transparent, and flexible tools for portfolio construction. In recent years, Invesco has experienced strong growth in this segment and already holds over $20 billion in assets under management across ETFs in Latin America and US Offshore, consolidating its position as one of the leading providers in both markets.
Santamaría brings 20 years of international experience in the asset management industry, with a track record focused on fund distribution and business development in Latin America and US Offshore. Before joining Invesco, he served as Head of Distribution for US Offshore at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, where he led the commercial strategy for this market. Previously, he held senior positions at Compass Group, Carmignac, and Amundi, serving in various commercial management roles for Latin America, including opening Amundi’s office in Mexico and managing the regional distribution business. He began his professional career at Société Générale Asset Management (SGAM) in Paris.
He holds a degree in Finance and International Relations from Universidad Externado de Colombia and a Master of Science in Management from NEOMA Business School in France. He speaks Spanish, English, French, and Portuguese.
Santamaría will report to Laure Peyranne, Head of ETFs for Iberia, Latin America, and the US Offshore market. Peyranne noted that Santamaría’s appointment “reinforces our commitment to these markets and will allow us to continue staying closer to our clients. His extensive international experience in distribution, deep understanding of Latin America and US Offshore, and proven track record will be key as we continue to build our ETF business. We want to remain closely attuned to our clients’ needs, offering them top-tier service alongside innovative, efficient investment solutions tailored for portfolio construction.”
In addition, Íñigo Escudero, Country Head at Invesco for Southern Europe, Latin America, and US Offshore, emphasized that “Saúl’s support, Laure’s leadership, and our operational capabilities and infrastructure across Europe and the United States will allow us to continue expanding our footprint in markets with immense growth potential. Our ability to combine active management, ETFs, and specialized investment solutions puts us in a privileged position to meet our clients’ needs.”
With the addition of Saúl Santamaría, Invesco’s Madrid office will comprise 22 professionals. The Southern Europe, Latin America, and US Offshore region oversees a total of over $100 billion in assets under management as of July 31.
